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ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: REFORMING STATE 
STATUTES AFTER OBERGEFELL V. HODGES AND PAVAN 
V. SMITH 
BY THOMAS B. JAMES* 
Assisted reproduction provides a way for people to become par-
ents other than through sexual intercourse. Some heterosexual couples 
turn to it when they are having difficulty conceiving children. For same-
sex couples, it is the only way to conceive children. Many states have 
enacted statutes conferring parental status on couples who use assisted 
reproduction technology and shielding gamete donors from parental re-
sponsibilities. Statutes addressing only artificial insemination and not 
in-vitro fertilization leave the parental rights of couples who use donor 
eggs, and the parental responsibilities of egg donors, uncertain. The con-
stitutionality of statutes authorizing only opposite-sex married couples 
to establish parental rights, limiting assisted reproduction to artificial 
insemination, and protecting only sperm donors from parental responsi-
bilities is dubious at best. The Article describes the changes needed to 
bring these statutes current with modern science and into compliance 
with constitutional requirements.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 5 of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA 1973) pro-
vides: 
Artificial Insemination 
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and 
with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated 
artificially with semen donated by a man not her hus-
band, the husband is treated in law as if he were the nat-
ural father of a child thereby conceived. The husband’s 
consent must be in writing and signed by him and his 
wife. The physician shall certify their signatures and the 
date of the insemination, and file the husband’s consent 
with the [State Department of Health], where it shall be 
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kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the phy-
sician’s failure to do so does not affect the father and 
child relationship. All papers and records pertaining to 
the insemination, whether part of the permanent record 
of a court or of a file held by the supervising physician 
or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon an or-
der of the court for good cause shown. 
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician 
for use in artificial insemination of a married woman 
other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were 
not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.1 
This or a statute like it has been enacted and is still in effect in 
fifteen states.2 In some states, it has remained unchanged for nearly forty 
years.3 
In the decades that have passed since this law was enacted, many 
significant scientific, social, and legal changes have taken place.4 Dra-
matic advancements have been made in assisted reproduction technol-
ogy (ART).5 Sexual intercourse and artificial insemination are not the 
only methods of conceiving children anymore.6 In addition, the ac-
ceptance of parentage outside of marriage has increased significantly,7 
                                                            
 1  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
 2  See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-501(B) (2007); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2015); IDAHO CODE § 39-5403 
(2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2301 (Supp. 2014); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (2009); MASS. 
GEN. L. ch. 46, § 4B (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2824(6) (2018); MINN. STAT. 
§ 257.56 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824(1) (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-
106(1) (2015); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 
(2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(1) (West Supp. 2016). 
 3  Compare Parentage Act, Minn. Laws ch. 589 § 6 (1980) with MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (West 
2015). 
4  See discussion infra Part II. 
 5  Assisted reproduction means conception other than by sexual intercourse. MODEL ACT 
GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(1) (2008). Collaborative reproduction is “assisted 
reproduction in which an individual other than an intended parent(s) provides genetic material 
or agrees to act as a gestational carrier.” Id. at §102(5). Assisted reproduction technology (ART) 
is any method of causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse. Id. at §102(2). 
 6  See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 7  See Benjamin G. Ledsham, Note, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marriage Through 
the Lens of Illegitimacy-Based Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373, 2375 (2007) 
(“[I]llegitimacy-based discrimination against children of [opposite-sex] couples has largely 
faded from the legal (and social) landscape . . . .”); cf. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not 
Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-
First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 211–12 (2009) (noting that the “legal doctrine of 
‘illegitimacy’ had all but disappeared”). 
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as has the number of children born to single women.8 Among some pop-
ulations, more children are conceived by unmarried women than by 
married women.9 Finally, and most recently, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that states must grant same-sex couples the same marital 
rights that opposite-sex couples have.10 
Assisted reproduction statutes have not kept pace with these 
changes.11 In most states, they still protect only married persons.12 Gen-
dered language appears throughout them.13 Thirteen states address arti-
ficial insemination but not egg donation.14 Twelve states have no as-
sisted reproduction statute at all.15 “Throughout the United States, little 
                                                            
 8  In 1973, roughly 13% of births were to unmarried women. Stephanie J. Ventura & Chris-
tine A. Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States 1940-99, NAT’L VITAL STAT. 
REP., OCT. 18, 2000, at 1, available at 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48_16.pdf. In 2017, 39.8% of births in the 
United States were to unmarried women. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2017, 
NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Nov. 7, 2018, at 5, available at 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr67/nvsr67_08-508.pdf. 
 9  Hispanic black women and 52.1% of Hispanic women who give birth are unmarried. Mar-
tin, supra note 8, at 5–6. 
10  See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
11  See infra text accompanying notes 10–15. 
 12  See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-501(b) (2018); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 9-10-201(b) (2017); COLO REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-774 
(2018); FLA. STAT. § 742.11 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 39-5403 
(2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2301 (2016); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (2018); MASS. GEN. 
L. ch. 46, § 4B (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2824(6) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2018); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 210.824(1) (2017); MONT. CODE § 40-6-106(1) (2017); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
§ 73 (McKinney 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.90, 
3111.95 (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 551 to 556 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2017); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-703 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 20-156, 20-158 (2018); WIS. STAT. § 891.40(1) (2018). New Jersey makes its statute appli-
cable to partners in civil unions as well as spouses. N.J. STAT. § 9:17–44 (2019). 
 13  See, e.g., COLO REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2018) (containing 20 male-gendered nouns and 
pronouns). 
 14  See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-501(b) (2018); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 9-10-201(b) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 39-5403 (2018); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2301 (2016); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 46, § 4B (2018); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 
(2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.824(1) (2017); MONT. CODE § 40-6-106(1) (2017); N.Y. DOM. 
REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (2018); WIS. STAT. § 891.40(1) 
(2018). Sometimes a court can rescue a statute by imposing a gender-neutral construction on 
gendered language. See, e.g., Torres v. Seemeyer, 207 F. Supp. 3d 905, 914 (W.D. Wis. 2016) 
(requiring “husband” to be construed to mean a spouse of either sex). It is doubtful that this 
approach could save statutes that use terms with necessarily gender-restricted meanings such as 
“semen.” See id. 
 15  The states are Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. 
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legislative or judicial attention has been paid to anticipating and resolv-
ing potential legal ramifications of physician-assisted reproduction.”16  
This is not a trivial matter. Over a million people have turned to ART to 
conceive children.17 It is the only way for monogamous same-sex cou-
ples to procreate.18 
This article provides a framework for understanding and repair-
ing assisted reproduction laws. Part II explains the historical develop-
ment of parentage law, of which assisted reproduction law is part.19 Part 
III describes the objectives of these laws and the stakeholder interests 
they serve.20 Part IV identifies specific areas in which assisted reproduc-
tion statutes are deficient and suggests approaches for correcting them.21   
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Under English common law, parentage was linked to marital sta-
tus.22 The husband of a married woman who conceived or gave birth to 
a child during the marriage was deemed the child’s father, but children 
born to an unmarried woman were deemed to have no father; they were 
nullius filius (“kin of nobody.”)23 This principle carried over to the 
United States.24 The  father of a child conceived out of wedlock was not 
                                                            
 16  Kerry S. Cork, Comment, Test Tube Parents: Collaborative Reproduction in Minnesota, 
22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1535, 1537 (1996); see also Jean M. Eggen, The “Orwellian Night-
mare” Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Tech-
nologies, 25 GA. L. REV. 625, 709 (1991); Anne R. Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Dona-
tion: Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265, 267 (1995). 
 17  By 2015, more than 850,00 married women between the ages of 15 and 44 had used artifi-
cial insemination. Saswati Sunderam et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance—
United States, 2015, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 1 
(Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Feb. 16, 2018). In vitro fertilization and related 
procedures are performed on married women between the ages of 15 and 44 at a rate of 182,111 
per year. Id. 
18  John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 323, 325 n.9 (2004). 
19  See discussion infra Part II. 
20  See discussion infra Part III. 
21  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 22  Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1647, 1658 
(2015). 
 23  ERNST FREUND, ILLEGITIMACY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN FOREIGN 
COUNTRIES 9 (1919). 
 24  Id.; Suzanne E. Miller, Family Law—Support—The Natural Father of a Child Born Out of 
Wedlock May Not Assert as a Defense Against His Support Obligation the Mother’s Deliberate 
Misrepresentation That She was Using Contraception, 29 VILL. L. REV. 185, 189 n.19 (1984). 
JAMES  
2019] ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 265 
legally recognized as a parent unless he “legitimated” the child by mar-
rying the mother..25 French civil law, adopted in Louisiana, also linked 
parentage to marital status.26  
The first parentage statutes were enacted for the purpose of shift-
ing responsibility for the support of children born out of wedlock from 
the state to a child’s biological parents.27 They were also an exercise of 
a state’s police power to regulate morals, the object being to deter the 
crime of fornication.28 The result, in most states, was a legal system that 
treated unwed biological fathers as parents for purposes of the support 
obligation but as nonparents for inheritance, custody, and other pur-
poses.29 
By the middle of the twentieth century, many states had enacted 
laws codifying the principle that only the mother of a child born out of 
                                                            
 25  FREUND, supra note 23, at 12; see also Wright v. Bennett, 7 Ill. 587, 591 (1845) (holding 
that a father of a child born out of wedlock is not a parent); Friesner v. Symonds, 20 A. 257, 259 
(N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1890) (denying a father custody of a nonmarital child upon the mother’s death 
because only mothers are parents of children born out of wedlock); Bustamento v. Analla, 1 
N.M. 255, 261–62 (1857) (granting a writ of habeas corpus to a mother for the release of her 
nonmarital child from the child’s father); Timmins v. Lacy, 30 Tex. 115, 135, 137 (1867) (hold-
ing that only a mother, not the father, could authorize the apprenticeship of a child born out of 
wedlock). 
 26  JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 323, 328–29, 
418–20 (Boston: Little Brown & Co. 4th ed., 1889). 
 27  Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of 
Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1034–35 (2007); 
Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and Punishment in 
Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 1124 (1999). 
 28  See, e.g., Bake v. State, 21 Md. 422, 424 (1864); Dominik Lasok, Virginia Bastardy 
Laws: A Burdensome Heritage, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 402, 412 (1967) (“…[T]he parish could 
improve its funds by collecting the fine for fornication from the putative father and purge the 
public scandal by having him whipped”); W. Logan MacCoy, Law of Pennsylvania Relating to 
Illegitimacy, 7 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 505, 512 (1916–1917). 
 29  “[T]he duty of parents to their bastard children, by our law . . . is principally that of mainte-
nance. For, though bastards are not looked upon as children to any civil purposes, yet the ties of 
nature, of which maintenance is one, are not so easily dissolved.” 1 BLACKSTONE *458. “[A 
child born out of wedlock] can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody…. All 
other children have their primary settlement in their father’s parish; but a bastard in the parish 
where born, for he hath no father.” 1 BLACKSTONE *459. See also SCHOULER, supra note 26, at 
418. Under early English common law, children born out of wedlock were said to be filius pop-
uli, children of the state, in the sense that the community was responsible for their support. 
Lawrence Gabriele, Domestic Relations—Right of Putative Father to Visit His Illegitimate 
Child, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 192, 192 n.2 (1965). The Elizabethan Poor Law of 1576 empowered 
courts to impose a support obligation on fathers of children born out of wedlock, while custom-
ary law continued to assign responsibility for the daily care of a child primarily to the mother 
(and then to the state, if she was not able to do so). Act for the Setting of the Poor on Work and 
for the Avoiding of Idleness, 1576, 18 Eliz. ch. 3 (Eng.); Act for the Relief of the Poor,   
1601, 43 Eliz. ch. 2 (Eng.); Miller, supra note 24, at 189 n.16. Constitutions and statutes in most 
American states adopted this framework. FREUND, supra note 23, at 9; Miller, supra note 24, at 
189 n.19. 
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wedlock is a parent.30 The consensus at the time was that “the over-
whelming percentage of fathers of out-of-wedlock children are not in-
terested in their children, in recognizing them, in supporting them, in 
legitimating them, or especially in seeking their custody.”31 Since the 
United States Supreme Court had declared parental rights to be liberty 
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,32 a parent would have 
a right, under the Due Process Clause, to notice and an opportunity for 
a hearing before parental rights could be terminated.33 Excluding unwed 
biological fathers from the definition of parent ensured that mothers 
could place children born out of wedlock in the care of third parties 
(through adoption or a transfer of custody) expeditiously and without 
resistance.34 State supreme courts generally upheld the constitutionality 
of these enactments.35 The United States Supreme Court put an end to 
that in 1972, however.36 In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court held that both 
parents of a child have constitutionally protected parental rights and that 
statutory schemes that unreasonably discriminate against parents on the 
basis of marital status are unconstitutional.37 
                                                            
 30  See, e.g., 1951 FLA. LAWS 187 (codified with different language at FLA. STAT. § 39.01(56) 
(2019)) (“‘Parent’ means the father or mother of a child or the natural mother but not the natural 
father of an illegitimate child”); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1964) (codified with different lan-
guage at O.C.G.A. § 19-7-25 (1982))  (“The mother of an illegitimate child . . . [b]eing the only 
recognized parent, . . . may exercise all the paternal power”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-36-35 
(1960) (repealed 1975); S.D. COMP. LAWS § 25-8-46 (1967) (repealed); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
236 (1970) (repealed); WIS. STAT. § 48.02 (1967) (amended 1973); WYO. STAT. ANN.  § 14-53 
(1967) (repealed). The Illinois statute simply omitted unwed fathers from the definition of “par-
ent,” stating that “[p]arents” means the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor 
of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent.” ILL. 
REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701–14 (1967) (current version at 705 Ill. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1–3 
(West 2015)). 
 31  In re Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126, 131 (Minn. 1965). 
 32  Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
401–02 (1923). 
 33  Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972) (invalidating a statute that presumed 
all unwed fathers unfit to parent without providing an opportunity for a hearing); Mullane v. 
Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (observing that the fundamental right 
of an opportunity for a hearing “has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter 
is pending”). 
 34  See, e.g., Day v. Hatton, 83 S.E.2d 6, 7 (Ga. 1954) (holding that a state statute declaring 
that only the mother of a child born of wedlock has parental rights requires an award of custody 
to a third party to whom the mother had transferred custody rather than to the child’s father). 
 35  See, e.g., State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 178 N.W.2d 56, 62–63 (Wis. 1970), 
vacated, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). 
36  Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645, 658. 
 37 Id. 
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A. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT OF 1973 
The decision in Stanley v. Illinois impelled the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws38 (NCCUSL) to formu-
late a uniform state law on paternity that would pass constitutional mus-
ter.39 The UPA 1973 was the product of this endeavor.40 A core purpose 
was to ensure that “all children and all parents have equal rights with 
respect to each other,” regardless of the marital status of parents.41 While 
they were at it, the commissioners decided to address a novel legal ques-
tion that had recently been raised, namely, whether couples that use ar-
tificial insemination to conceive children are parents.42 
At the time the first sperm bank opened in 1970, “legal 
parenthood was largely coterminous with biological parenthood.”43 The 
only exception was adoption.44 The commissioners elected “not [to] deal 
with many complex and serious legal problems raised by the practice of 
artificial insemination”45 but reached a consensus about one thing: Ra-
ther than require a husband to adopt children whom his wife conceives 
using donated sperm, children born to married couples using physician-
supervised artificial insemination with the husband’s consent should be 
treated no differently from children who are conceived through sexual 
intercourse.46 
                                                            
 38  The NCCUSL is now known as the Uniform Laws Commission (ULC). About Us, 
UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview (last visited Mar. 
3, 2020). 
39  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (amended 2002). 
 40  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
 41  Id. § 2 cmt. 
 42  Id. § 5. 
 43  William C. Duncan, The Legal Fiction of De Facto Parenthood, 36 J. LEGIS. 263, 263 
(2010). The presumption of legitimacy during marriage originated in the idea that a husband is 
likely to be the biological father of children his wife conceives during the marriage. Id. It may 
also reflect a social judgment that the husband ought to be the biological parent. Id. The enact-
ment of statutes making the presumption conclusive (irrebuttable) tends to support the latter 
view. Whether rebuttable or conclusive, though, the presumption of legitimacy is that a husband 
is the biological parent of any children born during the marriage. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 
§ 257.55, subd. 1 (2018) (stating the presumption). The conclusiveness of the presumption 
simply regulates the extent to which the existence of a biological relationship may be chal-
lenged. 
 44  “Even adoption…has traditionally been organized by law in such a way as to create adop-
tive families that imitate biological parent families.” Duncan, supra note 43, at 263. 
 45  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, cmt (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
 46  Id. § 5(a) (declaring that the husband “is treated in law as if he were the natural father” in 
this circumstance). 
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B. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT OF 2002 
Two important developments occurred after the UPA 1973 was 
written. First, advancements in science and technology made it possible 
for women to donate their eggs to other women.47 Second, Congress en-
acted laws requiring states that wished to receive federal funds to “pro-
vide simplified nonjudicial means to establish paternity, especially for 
newborns and young children.”48 Cognizant of these developments, the 
NCCUSL decided to promulgate a revision of the UPA, which it did in 
the year 200049 (UPA 2000). 
Reception to the revisions was lukewarm.50 The American Bar 
Association objected that the Act still only recognized the right of mar-
ried couples to be parents of children of assisted reproduction.51 The or-
ganization took the position that unless the Act gave unmarried and mar-
ried couples the same right to be parents of children of assisted 
reproduction, it was unconstitutional.52 In Minnesota, the legislature es-
tablished a Uniform Parentage Act Task Force (Task Force) to study the 
proposed revisions and make recommendations about whether they 
should be adopted.53 The Task Force recommended against adopting 
them.54 Among other things, the Task Force shared the American Bar 
Association’s objection that the Act still limited assisted reproduction to 
married couples.55 The NCCUSL agreed that the objection had merit so 
in 2002 it released a second revision (UPA 2002), this one treating mar-
ried and unmarried couples alike in the context of assisted reproduc-
tion.56 The Task Force had already made its recommendation by then, 
however.57 As a result, the Minnesota legislature never considered the 
UPA 2002.58 
                                                            
 47  The first successful pregnancy using donated eggs occurred in 1983. Bonnie Steinbock, 
Payment for Egg Donation and Surrogacy, 71 MT. SINAI J. MED. 255, 257 (2004). 
 48  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). See 42 
U.S.C. § 666 (2019). 
 49  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). 
50 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, prefatory note (UNIF. LAWS COMM’N 2002). 
51  Id. 
 52  Id. 
 53  2001 Minn. Laws 645. 
 54  UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 3 (2002) [hereinafter TASK FORCE 
REPORT]. 
 55  Id. at 26. 
 56  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702, cmt., 703, cmt., 704, cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 57  The Task Force issued its report in January, 2002. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 
1. The UPA 2002 was released in December, 2002. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2002). 
58 See 2002 Minn. Laws 1838-1839. 
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Although the Task Force did not recommend adopting the UPA 
2000, it acknowledged “a significant need for comprehensive, specific 
legislation concerning the various aspects of parentage (or disputed par-
entage) and related matters when individuals use assisted reproduc-
tion.”59 That need still exists.60 
C. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT OF 2017 
Obergefell v. Hodges61 was a modern-day Stanley v. Illinois, ex-
cept that this time the victory was for same-sex couples, not unwed fa-
thers.62 Issued in 2015, it established that the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit states from lim-
iting the right of marriage to opposite-sex couples.63 Two years later, 
Pavan v. Smith64 clarified that Obergefell meant that states may not dis-
criminate against same-sex couples.65 States must give spouses in same-
sex marriages the same benefits and protections they give spouses in 
opposite sex marriages.66 If a state law provides for putting the hus-
band’s name on the birth certificate of a child born during a marriage, 
then the names of both spouses in a same-sex marriage must be put on 
the birth certificates of children born to them during their marriage, 
too.67 If Mr. and Mrs. John and Mary Jones conceive a child through 
assisted reproduction while they are married, and the law presumes John 
and Mary to be the child’s parents, then the law must also presume that 
a child conceived by Mary using assisted reproduction while she is mar-
ried to Joan is the child of Mary and Joan.68 
To adapt the UPA to the newly established constitutional man-
date to treat same-sex and opposite-sex couples alike the NCCUSL, in 
2017, promulgated another revision (UPA 2017).69 At the same time, 
the commissioners took the opportunity to address the right of children 
                                                            
 59  TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 24. 
60  Jeffrey A. Parness, Faithful Parents: Choice of Childcare Parentage Laws, 70 MERCER L. 
REV. 325, 325–26 (2019). 
 61  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
62  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972); see also Obergefell, 138 S. Ct. 2584 at 2608. 
 63  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
64  137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). 
 65  Id. at 2078. 
 66  Id. at 2078–79. 
 67  Id. 
 68  McLaughlin v. Jones ex rel. Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 498 (Ariz. 2017), cert. denied, 
sub nom. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S.Ct. 1165 (2018); see also Wendy G-M v. Erin G-
M, 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 859 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (holding that the marital presumption of legit-
imacy applies to children born to same-sex couples, too). 
 69  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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of assisted reproduction to access information about their gamete do-
nors, and to provide for the elimination of the parental rights of men 
who impregnate women by sexual assault.70 So far, only California, Ver-
mont, and Washington have adopted this version of the Act.71 
 
III. STATUTORY OBJECTIVES 
Parentage law is concerned with the rights, responsibilities, and 
methods of establishing the identity of a child’s parents.72 It attempts to 
balance the interests of children, parents, and the state in a manner that 
complies with state and federal constitutional and statutory require-
ments.73 Assisted reproduction implicates an additional category of in-
terests: gamete donors.74 
A. STATES’ FINANCIAL INTEREST 
The principal reason for the enactment of parentage laws is to 
lighten a state’s welfare burden by compelling men to financially sup-
port the children they father out of wedlock.75 When a child’s biological 
parents are financially dependent on the state for financial assistance, 
adoptions serve the state’s financial interests by transferring responsi-
bility for children to couples who are able and willing to care for them.76 
Hence, states also have a financial interest in facilitating adoptions.77 
After Stanley, facilitating adoptions can no longer be considered a valid 
justification for completely obliterating parental rights, but it is still used 
as a justification for establishing short time frames and strictly enforcing 
                                                            
 70  Id. § 614, art. 9. 
 71  Parentage Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/commu-
nity-home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f (last visited Feb. 28, 
2019). 
72  Establishing Parentage, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS COUNCIL, https://www.crckids.org/child-sup-
port/establishing-paternity/. (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
73  Jeffrey A. Parness, State Lawmaking on Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents: More 
Principled Allocations of Powers and Rational Distinctions, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 479, 479-
480 (2017). 
74  Maya Sabatello, Regulating Gamete Donation in the U.S.: Ethical, Legal and Social Im-
plications, CTR. FOR RES. ON ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOC. IMPLICATIONS OF PSYCHIATRIC, 
NEUROLOGIC & BEHAV. GENETICS 352, 352-353 (2015). 
 75  Hatcher, supra note 27, at 1038; Lasok, supra note 28, at 407; Hansen, supra note 27, at 
1144; Current Legislation, The Uniform Illegitimacy Act and the Present Status of Illegitimate 
Children, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 909–10 (1924). 
76  Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of 
Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1032 (2007). 
 77  See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism: The Case Against Genetic Entitlement, 
91 TUL. L. REV. 473, 491 (2017). 
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procedural requirements for putative fathers to assert paternity.78 Prompt 
determinations of parentage for the purpose of establishing child sup-
port orders continues to be a principal objective of parentage laws, as 
well.79 
The federal government provides grants to states to help them 
establish and collect child support.80 Congress has conditioned these 
grants on a state’s enactment of the kinds of parentage and child support 
laws the federal government specifies.81 As a result, states have a finan-
cial interest in complying with federally imposed paternity establish-
ment requirements.82 
B. CHILDREN’S INTERESTS 
Identifying a child’s parents makes it possible to establish and 
enforce support obligations for a child’s benefit.83 Since parents are pre-
sumed to act in their children’s best interest,84 establishing and enforcing 
parental rights normally furthers that interest.85  Knowing who their par-
ents are also may benefit children psychologically, helping them acquire 
a sense of identity.86 Knowing their medical and genetic histories can 
improve children’s likelihood of receiving appropriate medical care.87 
Finally, parentage determinations help ensure that children receive the 
inheritances to which they are entitled.88 
                                                            
 78  Id. at 493. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983) (“The legitimate state 
interests in facilitating the adoption of young children and having the adoption proceeding com-
pleted expeditiously . . . justify a . . . determination to require all interested parties to adhere 
precisely to the procedural requirements . . . . “). 
79  Caroline Rogus, Fighting the Establishment: The Need for Procedural Reform of Our Pa-
ternity Laws, 21 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 67, 70, 74–75 (2014). 
 80  42 U.S.C. § 651 (2019). 
 81  42 U.S.C. § 654 (2019). 
82  See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2000). 
83  See How to Get Child Support, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT (Sept. 9, 2014), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/how-to-get-child-support. 
84  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000). 
85  See June Carbone, Legal Applications of the “Best Interest of the Child” Standard: Judicial 
Rationalization or a measure of Institutional Competence?, 134 OFFICIAL J. OF THE AM. 
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS SUPP. 2 S111, S112 (2019). 
 86  J. David Velleman, Family History, 34 PHIL. PAPERS 357, 369 (2005). 
 87  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 88  Cf. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770–71 (1977) (invalidating intestate succession laws 
that allow only children of married parents to inherit from their fathers). 
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C. PARENTS’ INTERESTS 
In an earlier age, children were considered a valuable labor re-
source for parents.89 Today, the law emphasizes the interest of parents 
in the companionship and care of their children, and in raising them as 
they see fit.90 Parents also have an interest in being treated fairly.91 In 
1923, the U.S. Supreme Court held that parental rights are protected lib-
erty interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.92 A long line of cases since then has affirmed that parental rights 
are not merely protected; they are fundamental rights.93 This means that 
a parent may be divested of them only if doing so is necessary to serve 
a compelling government interest.94 In addition, parents and children, as 
citizens, have a constitutionally protected interest in receiving the equal 
protection of a state’s laws.95 A primary reason the NCCUSL convened 
to promulgate a uniform parentage act in 1973 was to comply with Su-
preme Court rulings that state laws may not discriminate against chil-
dren born out of wedlock.96 Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, states must now attempt to provide equal 
protection of the laws along three different axes: sex, marital status, and 
sexual orientation.97 Individuals have an interest in making their own 
                                                            
 89  1 BLACKSTONE *452; MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1994); see, e.g., McEntyre 
v. Jones, 263 P.2d 313, 314 (Colo. 1953) (approving a jury instruction regarding the probable 
pecuniary benefit a child could provide for a parent, as an element of damages in a claim for the 
wrongful death of the child); Evans v. Farmers Elevator Co., 147 S.W.2d 593, 599 (Mo. 1941) 
(explaining that a child may assert a claim for loss of future earning capacity as an adult but the 
claim for lost earning capacity as a child belongs to the child’s parents). This interest continues 
to play a role in wrongful death cases where a parent makes a claim for money damages for the 
loss of a deceased child’s “services” in providing a parent companionship, society, and affec-
tion. John C. Duncan Jr., The Ultimate Best Interest of the Child Enures from Parental Rein-
forcement: The Journey to Family Integrity, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1240, 1270 (2005). 
90  See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (companionship and care); Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232–33 (1972) 
(right to direct educational and religious upbringing). 
91  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759. 
 92  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). 
 93  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–67 (2000); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; Parham v. J.R., 
442 U.S. 584, 602–606 (1979); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
535 (1925). 
 94  Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977). 
 95  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 96  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
 97  See discussion infra, Section IV.A, B, C and D. 
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decisions about procreation, that is, decisions about whether and when 
they will become parents.98 
D. GAMETE DONORS ’ INTERESTS 
Donors have an interest in avoiding the legal consequences that 
traditionally flow from a biological relationship with a child.99 Few peo-
ple would be willing to donate their gametes to others if it meant incur-
ring a risk of liability for child support.100 For this and other reasons, 
donors also have interests in confidentiality and anonymity.101 
E. TRIBAL INTERESTS 
Because tribes have a federally protected interest in the custody 
and placement of children who are members of the tribe or the biological 
children of tribe members, parentage laws should address whether and 
how they apply to these children.102  
 
The remainder of this article explores the specific changes that 
need to be made to state assisted reproduction laws to better accomplish 
the legitimate objectives of assisted reproduction laws, to comply with 
constitutional requirements, and to bring them up to date with modern 






                                                            
 98  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“personal decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and educa-
tion. . . are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)  (recognizing “the right of the individual. . . to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child”) (emphasis added). 
99  Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. 
REV. 93, 190. 
 100  Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1247 (Pa. 2007) (“[W]here a would-be donor 
cannot trust that he is safe from a future support action, he will be considerably less likely to 
provide his sperm. . .”). 
 101  See generally Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on Gamete Donor 
Anonymity and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 291 (2013). 
 102  TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 17. 
103  See discussion infra, Part IV. 
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IV. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
A. EGGS, EMBRYOS, AND IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 
Artificial insemination is the oldest known form of assisted re-
production, dating back to the eighteenth century.104  It involves insert-
ing sperm into a woman’s uterus, fallopian tubes, or vagina with a nee-
dle.105 Sperm may be fresh or cryopreserved; it may be used 
immediately or stored for later use.106 If the sperm comes from the 
woman’s husband, the procedure is called homologous insemination.107 
Heterologous insemination, or artificial insemination by donor (AID), 
involves a third-party donor.108 Egg donation is a newer phenomenon.109 
It involves extracting eggs, fertilizing them with sperm, and inserting 
the resulting embryo into the uterus of the recipient.110 This procedure 
is called in-vitro fertilization and embryo transfer.111 Like sperm, em-
bryos can be cryopreserved, so they may be transferred shortly after 
forming or preserved for possible future use.112  With the advent of in-
vitro fertilization and embryo transfer technology, gamete donation is 
no longer the exclusive province of males.113 
Assisted reproduction using third-party gamete donors squarely 
raises the question whether it is biological relatedness or intent that es-
tablishes parentage.114 If biological relatedness is determinative, then a 
                                                            
 104  Willem Ombelet & Johan Van Robays, Artificial Insemination—History: Hurdles and 
Milestones, 7 FACTS, VIEWS & VISIONS IN OBGYN 137, 138 (2015). 
 105  Julie E. Goodwin, Comment, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address 
Equal Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. 
L.J. 208, 212 (2005). 
 106  Kate W. Lyon, Babies on Ice: The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos Involved in Custody 
Disputes During Divorce, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 695, 698 (2000). Cryopreservation is a process 
by which human cells are frozen, remaining viable for long periods of time. Id. at  699. 
107  Priyasha Saksena, Artificial Insemination and the Family, 20 NAT’L LAW SCH. OF INDIA 
REV. 76, 78 (2008). 
108  Id. 
 109  John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in Human Egg 
Donation, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988–1989). 
 110  Michelle L. Anderson, Comment, Are You My Mommy? A Call for Regulation of Embryo 
Donation, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 589, 599–600 (2006). 
 111  The UPA 2017 defines “assisted reproduction” to include (a) intrauterine or intracervical 
insemination, (b) donation of gametes, (c) donation of embryos, (d) in-vitro fertilization and 
transfer of embryos, and (e) intracytoplasmic sperm injection. There is some overlap in these 
categories. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 112  Lyon, supra note 106, at 698–99. 
113  See Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of Oo-
cyte Donors, 40 HASTINGS CTR. REP., 25 (2010). 
114  Lyon , supra note 106, at 726. 
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gamete donor will be a child’s legal parent even if everybody involved 
intended the recipient and the recipient’s spouse or significant other, if 
any, to be the child’s parent(s).115 If intent is determinative, then a gam-
ete donor will not be a parent unless that is what the parties intended.116 
In the absence of legislative guidance, courts have developed and ap-
plied contradictory rules of decision.117 Sometimes they will ascribe no 
significance to genetics and focus instead on effectuating the parties ’ 
intent, an approach that can result in a determination that a donor is not 
a parent but can also result in a determination that a donor is a parent.118  
At other times, they will ignore the parties ’ intent and rely instead on 
genetic relatedness.119 Obviously, this has created a great deal of uncer-
tainty in the law.120 Some guidance from legislatures would be helpful. 
Legislation clarifying that assisted reproduction statutes apply to 
both sperm donors and egg donors is also needed. Thirteen states have 
statutes that reference sperm donors, artificial insemination, or both, but 
not egg donors or in-vitro fertilization.121 It is remarkable that the legis-
latures of these states have never amended their statutes to provide fe-
male gamete donors the same legal protections as male gamete donors, 
given that more than one commentator has observed that these statutes 
violate women’s Equal Protection rights.122 
It might be thought that it is not necessary to explicitly state that 
egg donors are not parents because only a person who carries a baby in 
                                                            
115  Alisa Von Hagel, Federalism and Bioethics: Women’s Health and the Regulation of Oo-
cyte Donation, 33 POL. & LIFE SCI. 79 (2014). 
116  Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d I74, 182 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that the law honors the parties 
clearly manifested intentions to donate their pre-zygotes for research purposes). 
117  Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Deter-
mination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 841 (2000). 
 118  See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (applying intent analysis to 
hold that an egg donor, not the birth mother, is a child’s parent); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 
A.2d 1236, 1246 (Pa. 2007) (applying intent analysis to hold that a sperm donor is not a child’s 
parent). 
 119  See, e.g., Bassett v. Saunders, 835 So. 2d 1198, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding a 
waiver of a biological parent’s child support obligation is against public policy and unenforce-
able regardless of the parties’ intent). 
120  Marsha Garrison, Law Making For Baby Making: An Interpretative Approach to the 
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 845, 838 (2000). 
 121  See ALASKA STAT.  § 25.20.045 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-501 (2007); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2015); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401–
408 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. §23-2301  (Supp. 2014); MASS. GEN. L. Part I, title 7, ch. 46, §4B 
(2018); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. §210.824 (West 2010); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (2015); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (MCKINNEY 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 49A-1 (2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 2016). 
 122  See Mary Lynne Birck, Comment, Modern Reproductive Technology and Motherhood: 
The Search for Common Ground and the Recognition of Difference, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1623, 
1653 (1994); Cork, supra note 16, at 1561. 
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her womb can be a mother. State laws are far from certain on this point, 
however.123 For example, a Minnesota statute authorizes a legal action 
to declare the existence of a mother-child relationship and makes Min-
nesota Statutes §§ 257.51 to 257.74 applicable to it.124 These statutes, in 
turn, authorize a mother-child relationship to be established either “by 
proof of her having given birth to the child, or under sections 257.51 to 
257.74 or 257.75.”125 Among other things, these sections provide that a 
biological relationship between a person and a child, as determined by 
genetic testing, can be used as the basis for a finding that the person is 
the child’s parent.126 An egg donor has a biological relationship with a 
child that is conceived using her eggs.127 Therefore, these statutes could 
reasonably be interpreted to mean that either or both the birth mother 
and the egg donor (biological mother) could be parents of a child con-
ceived with a donated egg.128 
Of course, the Equal Protection Clause does not impose an ab-
solute prohibition against legislative classifications that treat people dif-
ferently.129 The classification must at least be rational, though, i.e., it 
must treat people “who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose 
of the law” the same.130 The purpose of assisted reproduction statutes, 
insofar as they concern donors, is to protect people who donate their 
gametes to others from being declared the parents of children conceived 
with them.131 Men and women may not be similarly situated with respect 
to the ability to become pregnant, but they are similarly situated with 
respect to the capacity to donate gametes to others.132 They were not 
                                                            
123  See infra text accompanying notes 124–28. 
 124  MINN. STAT. § 257.71 (2018). 
 125  MINN. STAT. § 257.54(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 126  MINN. STAT. § 257.62 (2018). 
127  Susan Golombok et al., Children conceived by gamete donation: Psychological adjustment 
and mother-child relationships at age 7, 25 J. FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY, 230 (2011). 
128  Compare MINN. STAT. § 257.71 (2018) with; MINN. STAT. § 257.54(a) (2018); and MINN. 
STAT. § 257.62 (2018). 
 129  Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). 
 130  Jospeh Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 
341, 346 (1949). 
 131  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 132  Christina M. Eastman, Comment, Statutory Regulation of Legal Parentage in Cases of 
Artificial Insemination by Donor: A New Frontier of Gender Discrimination, 41 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 371, 391–92 (2010). Gamete donors use their gametes to enable others to become preg-
nant, not to become pregnant themselves. Id. See also Lord v. Lord, 409 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47–48 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding men and women are also similarly situated with respect to the 
child support obligation). 
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similarly situated in this respect at the time the UPA 1973 was promul-
gated, but they are now.133 
Statutes that discriminate against similarly situated individuals 
on the basis of sex violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment unless they are substantially related to achieving an im-
portant government interest.134 An “exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion” is needed to sustain them.135 Statutes are scrutinized even more 
closely if they discriminate with respect to a fundamental right.136 When 
that is the case, a state must demonstrate that the classification is neces-
sary and narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling state interest.137 
The right of personal autonomy with regard to the decision not to be-
come a parent is a fundamental right.138 No important or compelling 
nondiscriminatory interest is served by protecting male gamete donors 
but not female gamete donors from child support obligations, or by au-
thorizing couples to become legal parents using donated sperm but not 
donated eggs.139   
B. SAME-SEX COUPLES 
The UPA 1973 and state statutes adopting it were written long 
before Obergefell and Pavan v. Smith held that states must treat same-
sex and opposite-sex couples alike. Today, if a state extends a right of 
marriage to opposite-sex couples, then it must extend the right of mar-
riage to same-sex couples, too.140 If a state extends a benefit of marriage 
to opposite-sex couples, then it must extend the same benefit to same-
sex couples, too.141 This includes the benefit of a presumption that the 
                                                            
133  See Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of Oo-
cyte Donors, 40 HASTINGS CTR. REP., 25 (2010) (stating that the first IVF birth occurred in 
1983). 
 134  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
 135  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
 136  Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977). 
 137  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U. S. 
621, 627 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 138  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at 154; 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; Skinner v. Oklahoma 
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: 
FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 57–58 (1994); see also Davis v. Davis, 
842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992) (invoking the constitutionally protected right to decide not 
to become a parent to uphold an individual’s right to object to the implantation of embryos to 
which s/he has contributed gametes). 
 139  See Eastman, supra note 132, at 396–405, for a detailed analysis concluding that assisted 
reproduction statutes limited to artificial insemination violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
 140  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
 141  Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078–79 (2017). 
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spouse of a woman who gives birth to a child during the marriage is a 
parent of the child.142 If a state declares that the male spouse of a woman 
who conceives or gives birth to a child of assisted reproduction during 
the marriage is a parent of the child, then it must also declare that the 
female spouse of a woman who conceives or gives birth to a child of 
assisted reproduction during the marriage is a parent of the child.143 To 
comply with constitutional requirements, therefore, assisted reproduc-
tion statutes should be made gender-neutral so they apply to both same-
sex and opposite-sex couples.144 Gendered pronouns should be replaced 
with gender-neutral ones.145 The words husband and wife should be re-
placed with spouse.146 The words mother and father should be replaced 
with parent.147 
C. UNMARRIED COUPLES 
Most states that adopted the UPA 1973 opted to make the ART 
provision applicable to both married and unmarried couples.148 When 
the NCCUSL issued its first revision of the UPA in 2000, the American 
Bar Association objected to provisions that did not treat children of mar-
ried and unmarried parents the same.149 The Task Force voiced this ob-
jection, as well.150 The NCCUSL agreed the objection had merit and 
therefore removed references to “husbands” and “wives” from the 
Act.151 Despite this, a majority of state statutes still only recognize the 
right of married couples to conceive children using third-party donors.152 
                                                            
 142  McLaughlin v. Jones ex rel. Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 498 (Ariz. 2017), cert. denied, 
sub nom. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S.Ct. 1165 (2018) (“The marital paternity presump-
tion is a benefit of marriage, and following Pavan and Obergefell, the state cannot deny same-
sex spouses the same benefits afforded opposite-sex spouses”). 
 143  Pavan, 137 S.Ct. at 2077–79. 
 144  See id. 
145  Douglas Nejaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L. J. 2260, 2342 (2017). See gen-
erally Colorado General Assembly Office of Legis. Legal Services, COLORADO LEGISLATIVE 
DRAFTING MANUAL 1, 133-136 (2017). 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
 148  Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and Binding Biology: Seeking AID in the 
Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524, 536 n.40 (1994). 
 149  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 150  TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, executive summary. 
 151  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 152  ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 25-501 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2018); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-771(a) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 742.11 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 
(2015); IDAHO CODE § 39-5403 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2301 (Supp. 2014); LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. Art. 188 (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 46, § 4B (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
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This is not a significant problem for the female member of an 
unmarried couple that uses artificial insemination to conceive.153 Since 
the birth mother’s own egg is used in this situation, she will be both the 
biological mother and the birth mother.154 She may use either of these 
as a basis for claiming to be a parent.155 It is a significant problem for 
the other member of an unmarried couple, though.156 Not having a bio-
logical relationship with the child and not having the benefit of a pre-
sumption of legitimacy during marriage, s/he will not be considered the 
child’s parent even if the couple complies with all the requirements set 
out in the state’s statute.157 In some states, it might be possible to invoke 
a statutory presumption of parentage if the person lives with the child 
and holds the child out as his or her own.158 Even if it is available in a 
particular jurisdiction, however, not everybody will be able to invoke 
this presumption.159 An unmarried person must either endure the delay 
and expense of adoption or wait a while and hope the mother does not 
decide to move away with the child.160 Even then, it will still be neces-
sary to file a petition in court and ask a judge to declare his or her par-
entage.161 Assisted reproduction statutes, by contrast, declare a married 
person a parent immediately upon the birth of the child.162 A spouse is 
not required to petition for adoption or to commence a proceeding in 
court to establish parentage, much less wait a couple of years to do so.163 
                                                            
333.2824(6) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 2010); 
MONT. CODE ANN § 40-6-106 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (2019) (“Spouse Or Partner In 
A Civil Union”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (2015); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.90–95 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 551-556 (2018); OR. 
REV. STAT. §§ 109.243, 677.365 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78b-15-703 (West 2018); VA. CODE §§ 20-156-158 (2018); WIS. STAT. § 891.40 (West Supp. 
2016). 
153  Barbara Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman’s Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for 
an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 5(1981). 
154  Id. at 38. 
155  Id. at 18-19. 
156  Id. at 4. 
157  Custody of a Child Conceived by Artificial insemination, HG, https://www.hg.org/legal-
articles/custody-of-a-child-conceived-by-artificial-insemination-47245 (last visited Nov. 10, 
2019). 
 158  For an example of this kind of statute, see MINN. STAT. § 257.55(1)(d) (2018). 
159  Id. 
160  NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES, 4 
(2019). 
161  Id. 
 162  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973); UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N  2000); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
§ 703 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N  2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N  2017). 
163  See Parentage/Paternity, CALIFORNIA COURTS, https://www.courts.ca.gov/selfhelp-parent-
age.htm?rdeLocaleAttr=en&print=1 (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
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Moreover, a married person’s parental rights, having been established 
at birth, are not defeasible if the other spouse decides to move away with 
the children.164 Courts may allocate custody and other parental rights 
and responsibilities between spouses in a divorce, but a divorce does not 
terminate parentage.165 
It might be argued that married and unmarried parents are not 
similarly situated because a biological relationship between a spouse 
and a child born to the other spouse during a marriage is the couple’s 
biological child by virtue of the presumption of legitimacy but an un-
married mother’s boyfriend or girlfriend may or may not have a biolog-
ical relationship with the child.166 Assisted reproduction statutes are in-
tended to declare a person to be the parent of a child even in the absence 
of a biological relationship.167 They would not be needed if the presump-
tion of legitimacy were conclusive.168 They are needed when the pre-
sumption is rebuttable by proof that a person other than the husband is 
a child’s biological father, as is the case is in most states.169 Spouses of 
married women and the partners of unmarried women who consent to 
become parents through the woman’s use of ART are similarly situated 
with respect to the intent to be a parent of a child to whom one is not 
biologically related.170 Gamete donors for married and unmarried per-
sons are similarly situated with respect to their potential liability for pa-
rental responsibilities such as child support and with respect to their in-
tent not to become parents.171 The fundamental right of procreation is 
not restricted to married persons.172 Discrimination with respect to it is 
                                                            
164  Id. 
 165  WILLIAM A.H. SAMMONS & JENNIFER M. LEWIS, DON’T DIVORCE YOUR KIDS: PROTECTING 
THEIR RIGHTS AND YOUR HAPPINESS (1999). 
166  De Facto Parents: Parenthood Status Should Depend on Relationship Between Parent and 
Child, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu-wa.org/print/news/de-facto-par-
ents-parenthood-status-should-depend-relationship-between-parent-and-child (last visited Nov. 
10, 2019). 
167  Elizabeth J. Levy, Virgin Fathers: Paternity Law, Assisted Reproductive Technology, and 
the Legal Bias against Gay Dads, 22 AM. U. J. OF GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 893, 899-900. 
168  Id. 
 169  Naomi R. Cahn & June R. Carbone, Jane the Virgin and Other Stories of Unintentional 
Parenthood, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 511, 513 (2017). 
170  NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 160, at 1. 
171  Lisa Luetkemeyer & Kimela West, Paternity Law: Sperm Donors, Surrogate Mothers and 
Child Custody, 112 MO. MED. 162, 163 (2015). 
 172  Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438, 453 (1972). Strictly speaking, the right of procreation is a right of decision-making auton-
omy with respect to procreation, not an enforceable right to have children. The right does not 
impose an affirmative obligation on the part of a state to provide people with free access to any 
medical services that may be needed to make it happen. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 
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presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny analysis.173 
If a sterile married person has a legally protected right to procreate using 
ART, what compelling interest is served by denying sterile single indi-
viduals the same right? 
It might be contended that states have a compelling interest in 
preserving “traditional families” and that marriage is part of the concept 
of traditional families.174 The Court has certainly expressed great rever-
ence for the institution of marriage.175 Indeed, it has waxed poetic at 
times.176 The Court has never held, however, that a state has a compel-
ling interest in preserving a vision of what it considers “traditional fam-
ilies” per se.177 To the contrary, as Obergefell demonstrates, the Court 
has consistently rejected the argument that exalting traditional notions 
about marriage is a compelling justification for discriminatory state ac-
tion.178 
Some see the Court’s aggrandizement of marriage in Obergefell 
as diminishing, or at least threatening a diminution of, the rights of un-
married persons.179 “[T]he decision’s veneration of marriage might be 
interpreted as signaling that robust constitutional protections for non-
marriage are unavailable if marriage is widely available.”180 This con-
cern is understandable, but it must be remembered that the Court has 
                                                            
(1980) (holding that the constitutional right of abortion does not impose an affirmative obliga-
tion upon government to subsidize them). A state may not place obstacles in the way of a per-
son’s exercise of freedom of choice but “it need not remove those not of its own creation.” Id. 
A statute conditioning the exercise of the right to procreate using ART on marriage is an obstacle 
of a state’s own making. See id. 
 173  Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
174  Kritchevsky, supra note 153, at 17. 
175  George W. Dent, The Defense of Traditional Marriage, CASE W. RES. U. J. OF L. & POL. 
515, 608 (1999). 
 176  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593–94 (2015) (“transcendant im-
portance of marriage” and its “centrality. . .to the human condition”); Id. at 2608 (“embodies 
a love that may endure even past death”); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123–24 
(1989) (“sanctity”); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (“basic civil right[] of man”). 
177  Nan D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 GEO. U. J. L. & 
POL’Y 397, 401 (2001). 
 178  ““If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then received practices could 
serve as their own continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied. 
This Court has rejected that approach,” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U. S. 558, 566–67 (2003); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). 
 179  See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Comment, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 
104 CAL. L. REV. 1207, 1258 (2016) (asserting that “a victory for marriage equality comes at 
the expense of the unmarried and nonmarriage”). 
 180  Id. at 1248. 
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expressed reverence for nonmarital relationships, too.181 And this rever-
ence has not been invoked only for the benefit of same-sex couples.182 
Eisenstadt v. Baird183 vindicated the fundamental right of unmarried 
women to access contraceptives on the same terms as married women.184  
Same-sex relationships were not at issue in that case.185 
In the course of expounding upon the importance of marriage to 
both opposite-sex and same-sex couples, Justice Kennedy remarked that 
“[m]arriage also affords the permanency and stability important to chil-
dren’s best interests.”186 Although this was obiter dictum, it seems to 
suggest that the Court might find nothing objectionable in a statute that 
reserves the right of personal autonomy with respect to procreation ex-
clusively to married persons.187 Because the Court did not have the issue 
before it, though, it did not inquire into the question whether marriage 
relationships really are more permanent and stable than other kinds of 
relationships or not.188 It did not need to consider, for example,  the ef-
fect of no-fault divorce laws and other factors on the supposed “perma-
nency” of marriage.189 It did not need to consider whether the stability 
that marriage offers, if any, is or should be the sole or primary determi-
nant of—or even relevant at all to— what is in a child’s best interests.190 
It seems likely that if the Court had intended to retract its repeated as-
sertions that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best 
                                                            
 181  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (striking down prohibitions 
against sexual intercourse between unmarried persons); see also Murray, supra note 179, at 
1226 (describing Lawrence as speaking “movingly—even reverently—about the transcend-
ence of nonmarital sexual relationships”). 
182  See e.g. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972). 
183  405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 184  Id. at 443. 
185  Id. 
 186  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593, 2600 (2015). 
187  Id. 
188  Id. at 2593. 
 189  The divorce rate increased by nearly 50% during the first 10 years after California enacted 
the first no-fault divorce law in 1970. Sally C. Clarke, Advance Report of Final Divorce Statis-
tics, 1989 and 1990, 43 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 1, 2 fig. 1 (1995). The number of 
divorces tripled during the 20-year span from 1961 to 1981. Id. The precise impact of no-fault 
divorce on divorce rates is uncertain. Divorce rates were already on the rise before 1970, sug-
gesting that factors other than no-fault divorce played at least some role in increasing divorce 
rates. Id. 
 190  See, e.g., S.F. 1191, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2015) (removing “stability” from the 
definition of “best interests of the child” for purposes of custody determinations); see also 
MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2018). 
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interests of their children”191—even when the parent in question is sin-
gle192—it would have waited until the facts of a case before it necessi-
tated such a radical reversal of position. 
Statutory schemes that grant married persons, but not unmarried 
persons, a right to become parents using ART are not narrowly tailored 
to protect the best interests of children.193 There is no evidence that un-
married couples are worse parents than married couples are or that chil-
dren of married parents have superior developmental outcomes.194 A 
correlation between parental relationship transitions and adverse im-
pacts on child development exists,195 but correlation is not cause.196 In 
any event, the correlation has no bearing on whether being raised by a 
couple in a long-term, committed, nonmarital relationship is worse for 
children than being raised by a married couple that could easily become 
divorced at any time.197 A good case can be made that it isn’t.198 
States also have a legitimate interest in ensuring that children are 
adequately supported.199 Denying unmarried couples the right to procre-
ate using ART is neither necessary nor narrowly tailored to further that 
interest, though.200 The same objective could be achieved by declaring 
that unmarried fathers, like married fathers, are responsible for the sup-
port of their children.201 That is already the law in every state.202 
                                                            
 191  Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
 192  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000). 
193  Justyn Lezin, (Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women’s Ac-
cess to Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Doners, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. 
J. 185, 189 (2003). 
194  Mary Parke, Are Married Parents Really Better for Children? What Research Says About 
the Effects of Family Structure on Child Well-Being, CTR. FOR L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2 (2003). 
 195  Paula Fomby & Andrew J. Cherlin, Family Instability and Child Well-Being, 72 AM. SOC. 
REV. 181, 201 (2007). 
196  Id. 
197  See, e.g., Marilyn Coleman, Lawrence H. Ganong, & Mark Fine, Reinvestigating Remar-
riage: Another Decade of Progress, 62 J. MARR. & FAM. 1288, 1292 (2000) (reporting research 
finding that children whose parents have remarried do not have higher levels of well-being than 
children in single-parent families). 
 198  Id. 
 199  Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 851 (Vt. 1994). 
200  Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 669, 679–80 (1985). 
201  Child Welfare Information Gateway, The Rights of Unmarried Fathers (2018) 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/putative.pdf. 
 202  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3901(West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119A, § 2 (2018); 
MINN. STAT. § 257.66 (2018); Erika M. Hiester, Child Support Statutes  and the Father’s 
Right Not to Procreate, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 213, 218–22 (2004). The federal government 
requires states to establish procedures for determining parentage and enforcing child support 
obligations of unmarried fathers in order to receive welfare grants. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–669b 
(2016). 
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In view of the Court’s history of respect for the individual right 
of procreational autonomy of both married and single people,203 and be-
cause of the country’s history of discrimination against “illegitimate” 
children (as they were once called), something more than a rational basis 
is needed to justify a statutory classification that is based on the marital 
status of a child’s parent.204 While Supreme Court decisions in this area 
can be difficult to reconcile,205 it is clear that a state’s interest in discour-
aging unmarried persons from conceiving children does not justify 
denying a child a right to the support of the child’s parent in circum-
stances where the child would be entitled to such support if the parents 
had been married to each other.206 State laws that deny children of un-
married couples the rights of support that children of married parents 
enjoy unreasonably discriminate on the basis of marital status in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.207 
State legislatures should abide by constitutional requirements 
and adopt the recommendation of the NCCUSL, the American Bar As-
sociation, and the Task Force.208 They should make assisted reproduc-
tion laws applicable to both married and unmarried couples.209 
                                                            
 203  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000). 
 204  Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) 
 205  Baker, supra note 22, at 1694 (concluding that “[t]here is simply no way to reconcile all 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s legitimacy cases with each other”); Compare Lalli v. Lalli, 439 
U.S. 259, 275–76 (1978) (holding that classifications on the basis need only be “related to 
the important state interests the statute is intended to promote”), with Trimble, 430 U.S. at 
767 (declining to apply deferential scrutiny and insisting that review in this area “is not a 
toothless one”). 
 206  Trimble, 430 U.S. at 774–76; Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973); Weber v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through 
the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But 
visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust”); Scott E. Isaacson, 
Equal Protection for Illegitimate Children: A Consistent Rule Emerges, 1980 BYU. L. REV. 
142, 144 (1980). 
 207  Weber, 406 U.S. at 165, 170. Cf. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69, 71–72 (1968) (de-
claring unconstitutional a statute granting children of married parents but not children of unmar-
ried parents a right of recovery for the wrongful death of a parent). 
208  American Bar Association, Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology (Feb-
ruary 2008), 42 FAM. L.Q. 171, 175 (2008), https://www.americanbar.org/ con-
tent/dam/aba/publishing/family_law_quarterly/family_flq_artmodelact.authcheckdam.pdf. 
209  GLAD, Protecting Families No Matter How They Are Formed, https://www.glad.org/pro-
tecting-families-no-matter-how-they-are-formed/. 
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D. SINGLE WOMEN 
Many women desire to use ART to procreate without at the same 
time wishing to be involved in a relationship with another person.210 Yet 
only ten jurisdictions have statutes that both protect gamete donors and 
apply even when a single woman is the recipient.211 Again, procreational 
decision-making is a constitutionally protected fundamental right.212 To 
fail to extend this protection to the decision to conceive a child using 
ART instead of sexual intercourse “would be to disregard the underlying 
principle of procreative freedom, namely the right of a person to have 
children.”213 
Limiting the right to become a parent through ART to couples is 
neither necessary nor narrowly tailored to further a compelling state in-
terest.214 It might be argued that children fare better when they are sup-
ported by two parents rather than one, or that allowing single women to 
use assisted reproduction to procreate creates a risk of increasing a 
state’s welfare rolls.215 The risk that sperm donation to unmarried 
women will increase a state’s welfare costs is very slight, though.216 It 
could reasonably be argued that whatever small risk there is does not 
                                                            
 210  Clinics are not required to keep records of the number, so reliable data on single women 
who use artificial insemination to conceive do not exist. Jessica Yadegaran, No Mr. Right? More 
Women Start Families via Artificial Insemination, MERCURY NEWS (June 26, 2018), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2010/08/13/no-mr-right-more-women-start-families-via-artifi-
cial-insemination/. Some in the infertility industry put the number at about 50,000 per year. Id. 
This is a significant increase since 1987, when it was estimated that approximately 8,600 single 
women had used donor insemination. Vicki L. Henry, A Tale of Three Women: A Survey of the 
Rights and Responsibilities of Unmarried Women Who Conceive by Alternative Insemination 
and a Model for Legislative Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 285, 288 (1993) (citing U.S. 
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: PRACTICE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY—BACKGROUND PAPER 3 (1988)). 
 211  CAL. FAM,. CODE § 7613 (West 2019); D.C. CODE § 16-401 (2017); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
46/702 (2017); ME. STAT. tit. 19A, § 1922 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.660 (2013); N.H. REV. 
STAT. § 168-B:2 (2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-702 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-60 
(2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 701 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-902 (2018). 
 212  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 
316 U.S. 535, 542 (1942). 
 213  Nicole L. Cucci, Note, Constitutional Implications of In Vitro Fertilization Procedures, 
72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 417, 427–28 (1998). see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. L:aFleur, 414 
U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (stating that “[t]his Court has long recognized that freedom of personal 
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
214  Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 542. 
215  Paula Fomby & Andrew J. Cherlin, Family Instability and Child Well-Being, 72 AM. SOC. 
REV. 181, 201 (2007). 
 216  ROBERTSON, supra note 138. 
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justify reducing single women’s reproduction options by imposing pa-
rental responsibilities on sperm donors.217 More importantly, these ar-
guments assume that women are incapable of supporting themselves 
and their children without help from somebody else.218 Classifications 
based on sex-based generalizations and stereotypes violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.219 Because women are not necessarily dependent on 
others for support, a classification based on a woman’s relationship sta-
tus alone is not narrowly tailored to serve the purpose of ensuring that 
children are adequately supported.220 
There does not appear to be any rational justification for granting 
or denying donors protection from parental responsibilities depending 
on whether their gametes are used by a married woman, a woman with 
a boyfriend or girlfriend, or a single woman.221 State statutes should be 
amended to accommodate women who wish to procreate using ART but 
who do not necessarily wish to become involved in a relationship with 
                                                            
 217  Id. 
218  See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979). 
 219  Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) struck down a statute that provided for gov-
ernment aid to the children of unemployed fathers but not to children of unemployed mothers. 
The Court explained that the presumption that “the father has the ‘primary responsibility to 
provide a home and its essentials,…’ while the mother is the ‘center of home and family life,” 
is “part of the ‘baggage of sexual stereotypes” and not a legitimate ground for government-
imposed sex classifications. Id. at 89. see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (“Legisla-
tive classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inher-
ent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the ‘proper place’ of women and their need for special 
protection”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976) (characterizing as an invalid basis 
for state action ‘increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the 
home rather than in the ‘marketplace and world of ideas’”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and 
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by 
an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in particular effect, put women, not on a pedestal, 
but in a cage.” (footnote omitted)); cf. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (ex-
plaining that legislation is particularly violative of the Equal Protection Clause when it “serves 
to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities 
of men and women”). 
220  J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. at 130–31. 
 221  “Under the current statute, donors have no legal protection when single women are in-
seminated and could theoretically be held liable for child support. Also, the legal status of the 
child is in question.” Cork, supra note 16, at 1559. See also Henry, supra note 210, at 290 
(discussing the law’s deficiencies in protecting the rights of unmarried biological mothers 
and their offspring). Post-1973 versions of the UPA “shield[] all donors, whether of sperm or 
eggs… from parenthood in all situations in which either a married woman or a single woman 
conceives a child through ART with the intent to be the child’s parent, either by herself or 
with a  man, as provided in sections 703 and 704.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2002). California has long honored the procreational rights of single women. 
See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392 (Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he Califor-
nia Legislature has afforded unmarried as well as married women a statutory vehicle for ob-
taining semen for artificial insemination without fear that the donor may claim paternity”). 
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another person. All gamete donors should be protected regardless of 
whether their recipients are married or single. 
E. LEGAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTAGE 
Minnesota Statutes section 257.54 provides: 
The parent and child relationship between a child and: 
(a) the biological mother may be established by proof of 
her having given birth to the child, or under sections 
257.51 to 257.74 or 257.75; 
(b) the biological father may be established under sec-
tions 257.51 to 257.74 or 257.75; or 
(c) an adoptive parent may be established by proof of 
adoption.222 
This statute, like those of a number of other states, assumes that 
there can be only two kinds of parents: biological and adoptive.223 To 
accommodate the phenomenon of married couples using artificial in-
semination to conceive, the NCCUSL created a legal fiction that a hus-
band whose wife conceives using artificial insemination is the child’s 
“natural father” even though he does not really have any biological re-
lationship to the child at all.224 
Instead of trying to squeeze children of assisted reproduction 
into an outdated binary, it would make more sense to simply recognize 
three kinds of parentage: biological, adoptive, and legal. Under this ru-
bric, a biological parent would be one who has a biological (genetic) 
relationship with a child, an adoptive parent would be one who formally 
adopts a child, and a legal parent would be one whom the law recognizes 
as the child’s parent for whatever reason, whether it is a biological rela-
tionship, an adoptive relationship, an acknowledgement of parentage, 
an unrebutted presumption, or assisted reproduction. It is inaccurate and 
unnecessarily confusing to maintain a legal fiction that people who have 
                                                            
 222  MINN. STAT. § 257.54 (2018). 
 223  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-707(5) (2006), IND. CODE § 31-9-2-88 (2011), KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.710(14) (West 2005), MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-102(2) (2017), and 
N.J. STAT.  ANN. § 9:2-13(f) (West 2013) (defining the parent-child relationship as being 
based on either a biological or an adoptive relationship). The UPA 1973 defines “parent and 
child relationship” as the “legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adop-
tive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obli-
gations.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
 224  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
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no biological relationship to a child are the child’s “biological” par-
ents.225   
The UPA 2017 recognizes that people can become parents in 
more than two ways.226 It provides that a parent-child relationship exists 
between a person and a child if: 
(1) the individual gives birth to the child . . .; 
(2)  there is a presumption under Section 204 of the indi-
vidual’s parentage of the child . . .; 
(3) the individual is adjudicated a parent of the child . . .; 
(4)  the individual adopts the child; 
(5)  the individual acknowledges parentage of the child 
under . . .; or 
(6) the individual [is a parent of a child born through as-
sisted reproductive technology].227 
This approach is not only less confusing; it also has the benefit 
of being truthful and gender neutral.228 
F. CONSENT 
The UPA 1973 and statutes adopting or patterned after it condi-
tion a husband’s parentage of a child that his wife conceives by assisted 
reproduction on both spouses signing a written consent.229 Consent is a 
critical element of parentage through assisted reproduction.230 Without 
it, people could be made parents of biologically unrelated children 
against their wills.231 The requirement that the consent be in writing and 
                                                            
 225  Fixation on biological relatedness also “undermines contemporary movements to recog-
nize family forms that are not and could not be rooted in genetic connection.” Baker, supra note 
22, at 1695. 
226  See infra text accompanying notes 227-28. 
 227  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 228  See generally Jennifer Sroka, Note, A Mother Yesterday, but not Today: Deficiencies of 
the Uniform Parentage Act for Non-Biological Parents in Same-Sex Relationships, 47 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 137 (2013) (criticizing earlier versions of the UPA because they provided that a parent-
child relationship between a woman and a child could come about only by birth or adoption). 
 229  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
230  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
231  Id. 
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signed also makes sense.232 The parent-child relationship is too im-
portant to be decided on the basis of oral allegations alone.233 The re-
quirement raises some questions that will need to be addressed, how-
ever. 
1. The Effect of Noncompliance 
The UPA 1973 is silent about the consequences of failure to 
comply with the requirement that consent must be in writing and signed 
by both spouses.234 This can be a problem. Except in the case of surro-
gacy, it is generally understood that giving birth is enough to establish 
a mother’s parentage of a child.235 Therefore, people could reasonably 
believe that a birth mother’s signature on a consent to become a parent 
is unnecessary.236 If the birth mother therefore neglects to sign the form, 
should the consequence be that the child she conceives and delivers will 
not have a parent-child relationship with the spouse who signed the 
form?  Should the gamete donor be on the hook for eighteen years of 
child support? These seem like harsh penalties for an honest, reasonable 
mistake. Members of the Task Force probably had questions like these 
in mind when they observed that greater clarity is needed for determin-
ing who will be recognized as a child’s parent(s) in assisted reproduction 
cases when people fail to comply with statutory requirements.237 
Some states have enacted statutes providing that an intended 
parent’s failure to comply with statutory requirements does not give a 
sperm donor a right to claim biological parentage.238 This is not a com-
pletely satisfactory solution, however, because it leaves open the possi-
bility that somebody else (such as the intended parents, the child, or a 
child support agency) could claim the donor is the child’s parent.239 Peo-
ple who want to be parents probably are not inclined to claim the sperm 
donor is the father, but an intended parent could change his or her mind 
                                                            
232  Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of 
Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 69 (1974) (describing rationales for requiring contracts to be in 
writing and signed). 
 233  Id. 
234  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (showing the lack 
of explicit consequences for failure of parents to comply with the written consent requirement). 
 235  See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(1)  (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
236  See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 13. 
 237  Id. at 24. 
 238  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.62, subd. 5(c) (2018). 
239  See MINN. STAT. § 257.57, subd. 2(b)(1) (2018) (authorizing a child support agency to 
commence an action to declare that a man whom genetic tests determine within the specified 
degree of accuracy is a child’s biological father, is the child’s father). 
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if the relationship between the intended parents deteriorates.240 Should 
an intended parent be able to use a defect like the mother’s failure to 
sign her name to the consent form as a basis for asserting that a sperm 
donor is the child’s parent? What if the mother is or becomes a recipient 
of public assistance and the child support agency commences a paternity 
action naming the sperm donor as the father?241 
The UPA 2000 and 2002 address the consequences of noncom-
pliance.242 Section 703 provides: “A man who provides sperm for, or 
consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman as provided in Section 
704 with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the result-
ing child.”243 This makes it clear that the omission of the mother’s sig-
nature does not destroy the effectiveness of the consent form to establish 
the other person’s parentage.244 Section 704 provides that the failure to 
sign a consent does not preclude a finding that a man is the father if he 
lives with and openly holds out the child as his own during the first two 
years of the child’s life.245 The Task Force recommended adoption of 
these provisions because they “provide substantially clearer direction to 
the court to determine which man will be recognized as the child’s father 
in assisted reproduction cases where there is no clear consent by hus-
band.”246 
Consent is not a necessary condition precedent to nonbiological 
parentage.247 An unrelated person who lives with and openly holds a 
child out as his or her own may be presumed to be the child’s parent.248 
The rule should not be different merely because ART is involved.249 Of 
course, if Section 704 is enacted, then the wording of the “holding out 
                                                            
240  See Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J. OF L. & 
FEMINISM 211 (2012) (discusses issues regarding intended parents and ART). 
 241  See MINN. STAT. § 257.57, subd. 2(b)(1) (2018) (authorizing a child support agency to 
commence an action to declare that a man whom genetic tests determine within the specified 
degree of accuracy is a child’s biological father, is the child’s father). 
242  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 243  Id. 
244  Id. 
 245  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704  (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
§ 704(b)  (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (stating that if a man openly holds out the child as his own 
during the first two years of life, failure to sign a consent does not preclude him from father-
hood). 
 246  TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 24. 
247  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 248  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.55, subd. 1(d) (2018); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b)  (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2017). 
249  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (stating if the two par-
ties hold the child out as their own the court can find consent to parentage, which speaks to the 
idea that this should naturally extend to ART). 
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as one’s child” presumption in a state’s statutes should be harmonized 
with it.250 
What should the consequences of the failure of both spouses to 
sign a written consent to the use of a third party’s gametes be? In prac-
tice, married couples do not always realize that they need to sign a writ-
ten consent form if they both want to be parents of a child that one of 
them conceives using ART.251 Some courts have relied on common law 
or equitable doctrines to hold that both spouses are parents of a child of 
assisted reproduction if there is evidence that both spouses, although not 
putting it in writing, consented in fact.252 Other courts rigidly apply the 
written consent requirement.253 Recognizing that rigid application of the 
written consent requirement can produce inequitable results and harm 
children, the UPA 2017 allows the written consent to be signed before, 
at or after the child’s birth.254 It dispenses with the requirement of a writ-
ing altogether if there is clear and convincing evidence of the existence 
of an oral agreement that the parties intended to be parents of the child, 
provided the agreement was made prior to conception.255 
As is the case under earlier versions of the UPA, the UPA 2017 
does not require a writing if a person resides with and holds the child 
out as his or her own for two years.256 In this situation, it is not even 
necessary to prove the existence of an oral agreement.257 
The UPA 2017 adds more detail to the “holding out as one’s own 
child” provision.258 It specifies that in the absence of a writing, parent-
age might be established by proof that 
the woman and the individual for the first two years of 
the child’s life, including any period of temporary ab-
sence, resided together in the same household with the 
child and both openly held out the child as the individ-
                                                            
250  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 251  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 cmt (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 252  See, e.g., In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill. 2003) (reasoning that “if an 
unmarried man who biologically causes conception through sexual relations without the pre-
meditated intent of birth is legally obligated to support a child, then the equivalent resulting 
birth of a child caused by the deliberate conduct of artificial insemination should receive the 
same treatment in the eyes of the law”). 
 253  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 cmt (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).. 
 254  Id. § 704(b). 
 255  Id. § 704(b)(1). 
256  Id. § 704(b)(2). 
 257  Id. § 704(b)(2). 
258  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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ual’s child, unless the individual dies or becomes inca-
pacitated before the child attains two years of age or the 
child dies before the child attains two years of age, in 
which case the court may find consent under this subsec-
tion to parentage if a party proves by clear-and-convinc-
ing evidence that the woman and the individual intended 
to reside together in the same household with the child 
and both intended the individual would openly hold out 
the child as the individual’s child, but the individual was 
prevented from carrying out that intent by death or inca-
pacity.259 
This language provides much clearer guidance for the applica-
tion of the “holding out as one’s own” principle than existing statutes 
do.260 
2. Multiple Consents, Multiple Parents 
When the NCCUSL substituted man for husband, and woman 
for wife, in 2002 to make the UPA applicable to both married and un-
married couples, little thought seems to have been given to the possibil-
ity that an unmarried person might have more than one “significant 
other.”261 Bigamous marriages are void,262 so a woman can have only 
one husband at a time.263 Therefore, a law declaring that a husband who 
consents to his wife’s conception using ART is the father can result in 
only one man being the father.264 There is no law against an unmarried 
woman having multiple boyfriends or girlfriends, however.265 If she se-
cures consents to her use of ART from more than one of them, then the 
child will have multiple parents. 
                                                            
 259  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b)(2)  (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 260  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.55 subd. 1(d) (2015) (stating simply that a man is presumed 
to be a child’s father if “while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into 
his home and openly holds out the child as his biological child”). 
261  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT  § 201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 262  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2201 (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-7-1 (2018). 
263  Michael J. Higdon, Polygamous Marriage, Monogamous Divorce, 67 DUKE L.J. 79, 86 
(2017). 
264  See, UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) §703 (stating that an individual who 
consents to be the parent of a child conceived by ART is the parent of the child). 
265  See Colleen M. Quinn, Mom, Mommy & Daddy and Daddy, Dad & Mommy: Assisted Re-
productive Technologies & the Evolving Legal Recognition of Tri-Parenting, 31 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 175, 176 (2018) (describing the increased recognition of polyamory rela-
tionships). 
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While this scenario may seem fanciful, it really is not. The days 
of lifelong commitments to one person are gone.266 It is possible for suc-
cessive or concurrent boyfriends or girlfriends of the same woman to 
sign ART consent forms, each intending at the time to become parents 
and each therefore becoming parents of the child that the woman ulti-
mately conceives using ART.267 
Commentators have suggested that children should not be lim-
ited to only two parents.268 Some states even authorize courts to declare 
that a child has more than two parents.269 These states are proceeding 
very cautiously, though. The California statute, for example, allows a 
court to recognize more than two parents of a child only if it finds that 
being limited to two parents would be detrimental to the child.270 
Under parentage statutes other than those dealing with ART, it 
is possible for more than one man to be the presumed father of a child.271 
In these situations, a court must determine, based on public policy con-
siderations, which presumption should prevail.272 ART statutes do not 
                                                            
 266  Anjani Chandra, et al., HIV Risk-Related Behaviors in the United States Household  Pop-
ulation Aged 15-44 Years: Data from the National Survey of Family Growth, 2002 and 2006-
2010, 46 NAT’L HEALTH STATISTICS REP. 1, 8 fig. 3 (2012); Anjani Chandra, et al., Sexual Be-
havior, Sexual Attraction, and Sexual Identity in the United States: Data from the 2006-2008 
National Survey of Family Growth, 36 NAT’L HEALTH STATISTICS REP. 1, 17–18 (2011); William 
D. Mosher, et al., Sexual Behavior and Selected Health Measures: Men and Women 15-44 Years  
of Age, United States, 2002, 362 ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS 1,  2 fig. 
1–2 (2005). 
267  See generally, Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental 
Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 309 
(2007). 
 268  Laura Nicole Althouse, Three’s Company? How American Law Can Recognize a Third 
Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 173 (2008) (stat-
ing that there should be a three-parent framework available for same-sex couples); Nancy E. 
Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 231, 231–32 (2007) (arguing 
that in the age of birthfathers, stepfathers, and psychological fathers there should be a more 
flexible understanding of what constitutes a “legal father”); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? 
Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Par-
ents, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 309 (2007) (declaring that the “nuclear family” model is out-
dated); Polikoff, supra note 7, at 267 (arguing that children should not have to suffer because 
their parents are of the same sex). 
 269  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2018) (stating “a court may find that more than 
two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are parents”); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 
1853 (2018) (stating “a court may determinate that a child has more than 2 parents”). 
 270  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2018). 
 271  See MINN. STAT. § 257.55 subd. 2 (2018) (addressing the determination of paternity when 
two or more men are presumed to be a child’s father). 
 272  Id. (stating “[T]he presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considera-
tions of policy and logic controls”). 
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merely create presumptions; they declare who is and who is not a par-
ent.273 There is currently nothing in any version of the UPA explicitly 
requiring courts to assign only two parents to a child of assisted repro-
duction.274 
One way to address this problem would be to specify that there 
can be only one valid ART consent form per child. If this approach is 
taken, then a framework for deciding which of two or more consent 
forms is valid will be needed. In terms of effectuating the parties ’ prob-
able intent, a rule that the latest consent supersedes all previously exe-
cuted ones might make sense. If a woman and another person sign an 
ART consent and the woman later signs one with a different person, it 
would probably be reasonable to infer that the woman has broken up 
with the first person and now wants her new “significant other” to be a 
parent with her instead. It is not entirely clear, however, that a “last in 
time” rule would necessarily be the correct one to apply in every case. 
Consider, for example, the following scenario: Amy is dating 
Paula. They want to have children, so they sign an ART consent. Before 
conception occurs, however, they split up and Amy starts dating Char-
lene. Charlene doesn’t really have a strong interest in being a parent, but 
she figures it will be worth it to sign an ART consent form to keep Amy 
happy. Amy subsequently becomes pregnant using sperm from an anon-
ymous donor. Panicking, Charlene moves out. At Amy’s invitation, 
Paula moves back in. Immediately after the child’s birth, Paula and Amy 
establish a home together. Excited to be a new parent and having no 
reason to think her consent is no longer valid, Paula treats the child as 
her own for the first two years of the child’s life. The last anyone heard 
from Charlene she had joined a motorcycle gang in New Orleans. 
Who should the law declare to be Amy’s co-parent here—Paula 
or Charlene? From the child’s, the mother’s, Paula’s, and probably Char-
lene’s point of view, it should be Paula. Applying the “last in time” rule, 
though, Charlene would be Paula’s co-parent. 
                                                            
 273  See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 1973) (declar-
ing that when a married woman receives donor semen, her husband is legally the natural father); 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702, 703 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (declaring that a sperm donor is 
not the natural father of a child unless he consents); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702, 703 (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2017) (declaring that a sperm donor is not the natural father of a child unless he 
consents). 
274  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (omitting any explicit requirement that 
courts assign only two parents to a child of assisted reproduction); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2002) (omitting any explicit requirement that courts assign only two parents to a 
child of assisted reproduction); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (omitting any 
explicit requirement that courts assign only two parents to a child of assisted reproduction). 
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A better rule might be that when two or more ART consents for 
the same child exist, they give rise only to rebuttable presumptions of 
paternity. This is how Minnesota law deals with multiple recognitions 
of parentage for the same child.275 If this kind of rule were enacted, then 
both Paula and Charlene would have the benefit of the multiple consents 
presumption but only Paula could invoke the “holding out as one’s 
child” presumption. When parentage presumptions conflict, the UPA 
directs courts to decide which one to apply based on policy considera-
tions.276 Accordingly, a court could choose to apply the “holding out” 
presumption to favor Paula over Charlene. 
3. Withdrawal of Consent 
The UPA 1973 did not address the possibility that an individual 
might withdraw consent.277 The 2002 and 2017 versions of the UPA pro-
vide that if a person withdraws consent before placement of the eggs, 
sperm or embryos, then he or she is not the parent of the resulting 
child.278 This would be a reasonable rule to adopt, as it would prevent 
an individual from being made a parent against his or her will. Giving 
effect to withdrawals should also help reduce the frequency of multiple-
consent problems. 
The UPA 2017 requires written notice of withdrawal to be given 
to the woman who agreed to give birth to the child.279 Notice also must 
                                                            
 275  MINN. STAT. §§ 257.55 subd. 1(g), 2 (2018). 
 276  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(b) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (“If two or more 
presumptions arise which conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts is 
founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls”). The UPA 2017 provides 
considerably more specificity, directing “court[s] [to] adjudicate parentage in the best interest 
of the child, based on: (1) the age of the child; (2) the length of time during which each individual 
assumed the role of parent of the child; (3) the nature of the relationship between the child and 
each individual; (4) the harm to the child if the relationship between the child and each individ-
ual is not recognized; (5) the basis for each individual’s claim to parentage of the child; and (6) 
other equitable factors arising from the disruption of the relationship between the child and each 
individual or the likelihood of other harm to the child.” “If an individual challenges parentage 
based on the results of genetic testing, in addition to the factors listed in subsection (a),  the 
court shall consider: (1) the facts surrounding the discovery the individual might not be a genetic 
parent of the child; and (2) the length of time between the time that the individual was placed 
on notice that the individual might not be a genetic  parent and the commencement of the pro-
ceeding.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 613 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
277  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
 278  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 279  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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be given to the clinic or health care provider, but failure to notify a clinic 
or health care provider does not affect the parentage of the child.280 
4. Informed Consent 
The American Bar Association has proposed that states enact 
legislation to provide that “[i]nformed consent must be provided by all 
participants prior to the commencement of assisted reproduction.”281 
The proposal would require every participant to be informed, orally and 
in writing, of the following things, among others: the right to withdraw 
consent; the known and potential risks, consequences and benefits of 
ART; the possibility of unforeseen legal consequences; the advisability 
of seeking legal counsel; other routes to parentage, including adoption 
and sexual intercourse; confidentiality rights and obligations; rights of 
access to medical information about donors; and information about who 
has the right to possession and control of embryos or gametes.282 
While this kind of information can be beneficial to gamete do-
nors and people who wish to use ART to conceive children, a state that 
enacts an informed consent statute for assisted reproduction should 
make it clear that failure to provide the required information will not 
affect the validity of consent for purposes of determining a child’s par-
entage. Informed consent laws normally are enacted for the purpose of 
defining the scope of the consent defense in cases involving patient 
claims against health care providers, not to determine who a child’s par-
ents are.283 It would not be sound public policy to deprive a child of an 
intended parent and declare a sperm donor the child’s parent merely be-
cause a person was informed in writing but not orally that adoption is 
also a way of becoming a parent, for example.   
5. Minors 
No version of the UPA addresses the validity of a minor’s con-
sent to assisted reproduction or when it may be withdrawn.284 Because 
                                                            
 280  Id. 
 281  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH § 201 (2008). 
 282  Id. 
 283  Martin R. Struder, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: Protecting the Patient’s Right to 
Make Informed Health Care Decisions, 48 MONT. L. REV. 85, 85 (1987). 
284  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973)(failing to address the validity of a mi-
nor’s consent to assisted reproduction); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002)(fail-
ing to address the validity of a minor’s consent to assisted reproduction); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017)(failing to address the validity of a minor’s consent to assisted repro-
duction). 
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minors do not have a fully developed capacity to understand and appre-
ciate the consequences of their actions, the contracts into which they 
enter generally are voidable at their option.285 This is why some states 
allow a minor to vacate a recognition of parentage upon attaining the 
age of majority, and why a recognition form signed by a minor operates 
only as a presumption of parentage, not a determination of parentage.286  
One of the reasons the Task Force rejected the UPA 2000 was that it 
failed to distinguish between adults and minors in connection with the 
signing of documents that have the effect of making an individual a par-
ent.287 It is a valid criticism. An assisted reproduction statute could pro-
vide that a minor may withdraw consent at any time until he or she at-
tains the age of majority or the time the gametes or embryo are placed, 
whichever is later. 
6. The Effect of Divorce, Annulment, Legal Separation, or Death 
Several states have addressed the effect a dissolution of marriage 
has on a spouse’s consent to the other spouse’s use of ART to con-
ceive.288 Under the UPA 2002, a person who signs a consent does not 
become a parent if the sperm, eggs, or embryos have not been placed at 
the time of the divorce.289 The consenting spouse will be a parent if the 
gametes are placed before the divorce or if the spouse consented in writ-
ing that the spouse would be a parent of the child if the placement occurs 
after a divorce.290 These provisions reflect probable intent.291 It can prob-
ably be safely assumed that most people do not wish to conceive babies 
with a former spouse.292 An exception could be made for those couples 
                                                            
 285  Richard A. Lord, 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:5 (4th ed. 2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 286  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.57 subd. 2(4) (2018) (stating that a minor has the right to 
vacate within six months of turning eighteen) & MINN. STAT. § 257.75 subd. 9 (2018) (presump-
tion of parentage). 
 287  TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 8. 
 288  See ALA. CODE § 26-17-706 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. §19-4-106 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 13, § 8-706 (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1926 (2019); NEV.  REV. STAT. § 126.700 (2019); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-706 (2019); N.D.. CENT. CODE § 14-20-64 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 160.706 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-706 (West 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15C, § 706 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. §  20-158 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.275 (2018) 
(repealed 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-906 (2019). 
 289  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 290  Id. 
291  Id. § 702 cmt. 
292  See generally April Wilder, Strings Attached: What Happens When You Get Pregnant with 
Your Ex-Husband? (Feb. 2014) http://www.oprah.com/spirit/april-wilder-pregnancy-after-di-
vorce/all. 
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who clearly express an intention to become parents with a person from 
whom they have become divorced.293 
The UPA 2002 does not address legal separations or annul-
ments.294 The UPA 2017 gives these the same effect as divorces.295 
There does not appear to be any valid policy reason for distinguishing 
between divorces and other kinds of proceedings that terminate a mar-
riage relationship.296 Neither the consenting spouse nor the donor should 
become a parent if the other spouse unilaterally decides to proceed with 
the placement after the parties have split up, whether the placement oc-
curs after a divorce, an annulment, or a decree of legal separation. 
Under the UPA 2017, a former spouse will not be a parent if a 
transfer of gametes or an embryo occurs after the marriage is terminated 
or if consent is withdrawn before transfer.297 The Task Force recom-
mended a requirement that divorce proceedings address custody of bio-
logical materials (sperm, eggs, zygotes, embryos, and the like) that exist 
in storage.298 Given the profound impact an individual’s unilateral deci-
sion to have a child using another person’s gametes can have on the 
other person’s life and on the lives of child(ren) that are conceived this 
way, this seems like a reasonable requirement.299 It should also apply to 
legal separations and annulments. 
These rules are not easily adaptable to unmarried couples.300 
They are not similarly situated with married couples in this respect.301 
There is no formal procedure like divorce or annulment for ending a 
nonmarital relationship.302 Consequently, in the absence of a stipulation, 
the date of termination of a relationship is not as easily determined.303 
Foreseeably, courts could find themselves being called upon to decide a 
child’s parentage based on whether people intended a permanent termi-
nation of their relationship or only a trial separation. There is no formal 
procedure for re-establishing a nonmarital relationship (also known as 
                                                            
293  Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable 
Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55 (1999). 
294  Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part II. Questioning the Paternity of Marital 
Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 55, 67 (2003). 
 295  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
296  Trisha Zeller, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE, Ch. 6, § 63.02 (2019). 
 297  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (explaining that a “transfer” oc-
curs at the time gametes or an embryo are placed in a woman’s body). 
 298  TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 26. 
299  Deborah L. Forman, Exploring the Boundaries of Families Created with Known Sperm 
Providers: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 41, 62 (2016). 
300  June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 Md. L. Rev. 55, 95 (2016). 
301  Id. at 96. 
302  Id. at 70. 
303  Id. at 96. 
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“getting back together”), either. Thought would need to be given to the 
question whether consent is automatically revived when a couple reu-
nites after a breakup, and the level and kind of proof that would be 
needed to establish that a reunion was mutually intended to be perma-
nent (as distinguished from a trial reunion, for example.) It might be 
more expedient to require withdrawals of consent for unmarried couples 
to be made expressly rather than implied from the termination of the 
relationship. 
Legislators should also give some consideration to the effect of 
death on a person’s consent. It probably may be assumed that people 
generally do not wish to conceive children after they are dead. Accord-
ingly, a statute declaring an ART consent void if gamete or embryo 
transfer has not taken place before the donor dies would make sense. An 
exception could be recognized for cases in which the donor has clearly 
expressed a contrary intention. The UPA 2017 contains suggested lan-
guage for such a provision.304 
G. LICENSED PHYSICIAN OR DONATION FACILITY 
The UPA 1973 and statutes adopting or patterned on it required 
assisted reproduction to be supervised by a licensed physician.305 This 
requirement does not appear in later versions of the UPA.306 California 
has retained at least some form of it.307 The Task Force was concerned 
that without it, a woman’s sexual partner might try to avoid parental 
responsibility by claiming that he only donated sperm artificially rather 
than by having sexual intercourse.308 
Retaining the requirement of either a licensed physician or a li-
censed gamete bank raises a thorny question: What happens if the phy-
sician or gamete bank does not have a valid license? It seems unfair that 
the intended parents, the donor, and the child of the intended parents 
could be thwarted by a physician’s failure to pay a license renewal fee, 
for example.309 
                                                            
 304  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). Texas has already enacted a stat-
ute addressing this contingency. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (West 2018). 
 305  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
306  Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 
909 (2012). 
 307  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2019) (dispensing with the requirement if a li-
censed gamete bank is used). 
 308  TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 9. 
 309  Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 390 (Ct. App. 1986) & E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20 
A.3d 1171, 1175–76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011) strictly applied statutes mandating physi-
cian supervision. Those cases, however, involved individuals who did not even try to use the 
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A California statute provides that a man who donates sperm to a 
licensed physician or sperm bank does not become a father unless he 
and the woman otherwise agree in writing before conception.310 He still 
is not the father if he fails to donate to a licensed physician or sperm 
bank and either (a) he and the woman agreed in a writing signed prior 
to conception that he would not be a parent, or (b) a court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that he and the woman had an oral agreement 
that he would not be a parent.311 On the other hand, the donor will be the 
father if he fails to donate to a licensed physician or sperm bank, and he 
and the woman agreed he would be a parent in a writing signed before 
conception.312 
These provisions have the benefit of encouraging would-be do-
nors and recipients to enter into well-drafted consent agreements.313 
They will be of little help, however, in those cases where the donor, 
recipient, or both did no contingency planning because they both rea-
sonably but mistakenly believed that the physician or gamete bank pos-
sessed a valid license.314 A good argument may be made that consent 
given under these circumstances should nevertheless be considered 
valid.315 States may have a legitimate interest in regulating ART clinics 
and professionals, but there are less drastic means of doing that than 
making the parental status of their customers depend on the profes-
sional’s or business’s regulatory compliance.316 States could achieve 
their regulatory objectives by imposing criminal and/or administrative 
penalties on service providers who practice a profession or operate a 
business without a license, or with a revoked or suspended license.317 
                                                            
services of a licensed physician. Id. They are distinguishable from cases in which the parties 
make a good faith effort to comply with statutory requirements. Id. 
 310  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2019). 
 311  Id. 
 312  Id. 
313 Certain forms can be used to show the intentions of parents and donors involved in the 
conception of a child; these forms can serve as the foundation of a consent agreement can help 
protect the rights of all involved in the process. California’s New Assisted Reproduction Law, 
NATL. CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS. (last visited Nov. 9, 2019), http://www.nclrights.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/11/Cal-statutory-forms-assisted-reproduction.pdf. 
314  See e.g. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b)(2) (2019). 
 315  See Jerome Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1–44 (1957) (ex-
plaining the rationale for making “reasonable mistake of fact” an excuse for noncompliance 
with legal requirements, and the considerations relevant to it). 
316  While the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) issues lengthy guidelines 
to its membership, which consists of fertility clinics and sperm banks, ASRM does not sanction 
those who are in violation of its guidelines.  Michel Ollove, States Not Eager to Regulate Fer-
tility Industry, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/re-
search-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/3/18/states-not-eager-to-regulate-fertility-industry. 
317  Id. 
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H. ADJUDICATION OF PARENTAGE 
If multiple consents to ART can result in multiple presumptions 
of parentage, then a mechanism for resolving the conflict will be needed. 
It is also foreseeable that disputes may arise regarding the validity of a 
consent, the authenticity of a signature, or the validity or timeliness of a 
withdrawal of consent. For these reasons, state statutes should authorize 
parentage adjudication proceedings for children of assisted reproduction 
in the same way that they authorize proceedings to adjudicate the par-
entage of children who are conceived through sexual intercourse. 
In cases not involving assisted reproduction, state statutes typi-
cally specify who is authorized to seek a paternity adjudication.318 Care 
should be taken to ensure that these statutes, in addition to being gender-
neutralized to accommodate same-sex couples, are clear that a person 
who claims to be the legal parent of a child pursuant to the ART statute 
may bring an action for an adjudication of parentage, too. Intended par-
ents, alleged intended parents, and children of assisted reproduction 
should have a right to an adjudication of parentage when necessary.319 
To prevent the disruption of parent-child attachments, a legisla-
ture may want to consider establishing a limitations period for adjudi-
cations.320 The UPA 2017 would require a spouse to commence a pro-
ceeding to contest parentage of a child of assisted reproduction no later 
than two years after the child’s birth.321 There is no time limit if the 
spouse can prove that s/he (a) did not provide a gamete, (b) did not con-
sent, (c) did not cohabit with the birth mother since the probable time of 
assisted reproduction, and (d) never openly held out the child as his or 
her own.322   
The UPA 2017 provides a limitations period only for situations 
in which no valid consent exists.323 The commissioners evidently as-
                                                            
 318  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.57, subd. 3 (2018) (listing the child, the mother, the mother’s 
parent (if the mother is a minor or deceased), a man alleging himself to be the father (or a parent 
of a minor or deceased alleged father), and child support agencies). 
 319  Cf. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 612 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (adding a new provision to 
the UPA to specifically authorize proceedings to adjudicate the parentage of individuals who 
are or are alleged to be the intended parents of children of assisted reproduction). 
 320  Stephen A. Sherman, You Ain’t My Baby Daddy: The Problem of Paternity Fraud and 
Paternity Laws, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 273, 295–96 (2007). 
321  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 608 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (stating that the presumption of 
parentage cannot be overcome once the child reaches two years of age (with two exceptions 
determined by the court). 
 322  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (stating that the specified time 
limits would apply even if the marriage is declared invalid after assisted reproduction occurs). 
 323  Id. 
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sumed that only an invalid consent could invalidate parentage by as-
sisted reproduction.324 They did not anticipate the possibility that two or 
more properly executed consent forms might be signed for the same 
child.325 If a legislature adopts the UPA 2017 limitations periods, the 
language should be made broad enough to cover situations involving 
multiple consents as well those involving invalid consent. 
I. GENETIC TESTING 
Minnesota has enacted a statute prohibiting gamete donors from 
using genetic test results to claim parentage of children conceived with 
their gametes.326 A statute like this protects intended parents but it offers 
no protection to gamete donors.327 It does not bar a gamete recipient, her 
spouse, the child, or a child support agency from seeking to use genetic 
testing to establish that the donor is the parent.328 
Except in cases where the parties have failed to execute a valid 
consent or have failed to comply with some other statutory ART re-
quirement, it does not make sense to allow genetic testing to prove a 
donor is the parent of a child of assisted reproduction. The objective of 
assisted reproduction laws is to ensure that intended parents who use 
ART to conceive a child will be recognized as the child’s legal parents 
and that donors will be protected from the risk of being declared the 
parents.329 Genetic testing of donors would thwart that purpose. 
The UPA 2017 reflects this idea. It provides: 
Genetic testing may not be used: 
(1) to challenge the parentage of an individual who is a 
parent under [the ART statute]; or 
(2) to establish the parentage of an individual who is a 
donor.330 
                                                            
324  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017)  (outlining situations where a 
court would determine consent to be valid). 
325  Id. 
 326  See MINN. STAT. § 257.62, subd. 5(c) (2018) (“A determination [by genetic testing] that the 
alleged father is the biological father does not . . . allow the donor of genetic material for assisted 
reproduction for the benefit of a recipient parent, whether sperm or ovum (egg), to claim to be 
the child’s biological or legal parent”). 
327  Id. 
328  Id. 
329  See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 10. 
 330  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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This language makes it clear that neither the donor nor anybody 
else may use genetic testing to establish that a donor is the child’s par-
ent. “Because the parentage of an intended parent . . . is not premised on 
a genetic connection, the lack of a genetic connection should not be the 
basis of a challenge to the individual’s parentage.”331 On the other hand, 
because a genetic connection is a component of the definition of an In-
dian child, an exception should be recognized for cases involving Indian 
or alleged Indian children.332 
J. DONOR INFORMATION 
Gamete donors often prefer to remain anonymous.333 Accord-
ingly, gamete donation agreements may contain provisions protecting 
the identity of donors from being disclosed to the recipients or the 
child.334 While such contracts may increase the size of the donor pool, 
they can also prevent children from knowing their medical and genetic 
histories.335 This information can be critical to receiving appropriate 
medical care.336 
The UPA 1973 required physicians to file completed ART con-
sent forms with the state’s department of health and instructed the state 
to store them confidentially and indefinitely.337 This places children of 
assisted reproduction at a disadvantage relative to adopted children.338 
In many states, adopted children have a right to information about their 
                                                            
 331  Id. § 502 cmt. 
 332  See discussion infra Section IV.L.4. 
 333  See Gaia Bernstein, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Timing, Uncertainty, and Do-
nor Anonymity, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1189 (2010) (explaining that prohibiting gamete donor ano-
nymity reduces the availability of donor gametes, and erodes commitments to equality and the 
prevention of commodification in the ART space). 
334  Id. 
335  Id. 
 336  “Today, approximately 1.7% of all infants born in the United States every year are con-
ceived using ART.” Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART): ART Success Rates, CTR. 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/in-
dex.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fart%2Freports%2Findex.h
tml. This percentage is growing. Bernstein, supra note 101, at  298 (noting “that from 2004 to 
2008 the number of IVF cycles used for gestational surrogacy grew by 60%, the number of 
births by gestational surrogates grew by 53% and the number of babies born to gestational 
surrogates grew by 89%”). “Accordingly, it is increasingly important for states to address the 
right of children to access information about their gamete donor.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT pref-
atory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 337  “The physician shall certify their signatures and the date of the insemination, and file the 
husband’s consent with the [State Department of Health], where it shall be kept confidential and 
in a sealed file.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
338  See Naomi Cahn, Do Tell - The Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1077, 1111–1112 (2013-2014). 
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biological parents upon attaining adulthood.339 The requirement does 
not appear in subsequent versions of the UPA.340 
The UPA 2017 provides children of assisted reproduction a right 
of access to some information about their gamete donors.341 Distinguish-
ing between identifying and nonidentifying donor information, it bal-
ances the competing interests of children and donors by respecting a 
gamete donor’s wishes regarding disclosure of the donor’s identity 
while requiring gamete banks and fertility clinics to make a good faith 
effort to provide nonidentifying medical information about the donor to 
the child or the child’s parent upon request.342 Adopting UPA article 9 
would help ensure that children of assisted reproduction receive the 
same health care and legal protections that other children do. 
K. SURROGACY CONTRACTS 
A surrogacy contract, sometimes called a gestational agreement, 
is an agreement between a woman and intended parents in which the 
parties agree that the woman will become pregnant using ART and will 
carry and give birth to the baby but will not have any parental rights or 
responsibilities upon the baby’s birth.343 If the woman’s own eggs are 
used, she is called a genetic or traditional surrogate.344 If another 
woman’s eggs are used, she is called a gestational surrogate.345 
The 2000, 2002, and 2017 versions of the UPA authorize surro-
gacy contracts.346 The NCCUSL made these provisions optional, how-
ever, because the subject is highly controversial.347 Courts in some states 
have held that surrogacy contracts are void, deeming them contrary to 
                                                            
 339  Some examples of statutes granting adopted children a right of access to information about 
their birth parents include ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31 (2015), ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.50.500, 
18.50.510 (2019), CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9202, 9203 (West 2015), and MINN. STAT. §§ 259.83, 
259.89 (2018). This is not an exhaustive list. 
340  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 407 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (discussing the conditions under 
which a donor’s information may be released). 
 341  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 342  Id. § 905. The Task Force, too, recommended that children of assisted reproduction should 
have access to their gamete donors ’ medical information. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, 
at 25. 
 343  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
344  Alexus Williams, State Regulatory Efforts in Protecting a Surrogate’s Bodily Autonomy, 
49 SETON HALL L. REV. 205, 209 (2018). 
 345  Id. 
346  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 347  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
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the state’s public policy against sales or transfers of human beings.348 As 
of 2015, seven states and the District of Columbia explicitly prohibit 
them; fourteen states authorize some, but not all, kinds of surrogacy 
contracts; and the rest of the country does not have any surrogacy statute 
at all.349 
The Task Force recommended against enacting the surrogacy 
provisions of the UPA, believing additional analysis was needed to ad-
dress public policy concerns, not the least of which was whether surro-
gacy agreements should be permitted at all.350 Some of the concerns the 
Task Force raised were: Should genetic surrogacy, gestational surro-
gacy, both, or neither, be allowed?351 Should fee payments be permit-
ted?352 Should payments of expenses be permitted?353 Should payment 
of lost wages be considered a fee payment or an expense reimburse-
ment?354 Should agreements require pre-approval by a court?355 If so, 
should the statute set out specific requirements for agreements or leave 
judges free to exercise discretion to decide, on a case by case basis, if 
the agreement will serve a child’s best interests?356 Should pre-place-
ment counseling, evaluations, and/or home studies be required?357 What 
should the effect of noncompliance with statutory requirements be?358 
Should the law require each party to the contract to have independent 
legal counsel?359 Their spouses?360 What effect will an intended parent’s 
death before the child is born have on inheritance rights and guardian-
ship?361 
                                                            
 348  In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988); In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 
815, 818 (Fam. Ct. 1990). Some courts have also found them repugnant to adoption laws, on 
the basis that they circumvent the measures legislatures have put in place for the protection of 
adopted children (home studies, etc.) See, e.g., Anaconda Fed. Credit Union # 4401 v. West, 
483 P.2d 909, 911 (Mont. 1971); see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 369 (1932). 
 349  Joseph F. Morrissey, Surrogacy: The Process, the Law, and the Contracts, 51 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 459, 487–503 (2015). 
 350  TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 27. 
351 Id. at 31. 
352 Id. at 30. 
353 Id. at 28–29. 
354 Id. at 29. 
355  TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 27. 
356 Id. at 30. 
357 Id. at 29–31. 
358 Id. at 26. 
359 Id. at 22. 
360  TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 22. 
 361 Id. at 27–32. 
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Efforts to enact surrogacy legislation have had mixed results.362  
In some states, unsuccessful attempts to enact a surrogacy statute have 
been made several times over the course of the past decade.363 One strat-
egy legislators commonly employ when calls for surrogacy legislation 
are made is to establish a legislative commission to study the issue.364 
Because surrogacy is a complicated and controversial issue, it may be 
prudent to address it separately from other needed revisions to the Par-
entage Act, after such a commission has completed its study. The UPA 
provides details throughout regarding the kinds of language that should 
be used depending on whether a legislature wishes to make surrogacy 
agreements enforceable or not.365 These could be used as a guide if a 
state’s legislature and governor one day agree to explicitly make surro-
gacy contracts enforceable. There is no reason that legislation ensuring 
equal protection for the rights of children of assisted reproduction, 
same-sex couples, unmarried couples, and women could not be enacted 
in the meantime. 
L. CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER LAWS 
Care should be taken to ensure that reforms of a state’s assisted 
reproduction statutes do not create conflicts with other statutes. 
1. Probate Code 
The probate codes of some states contain, among other things, 
detailed provisions concerning the parentage of children of assisted re-
production for purposes of inheritance rights.366 Greater use of cross-
referencing could be made in this area. Rather than maintaining two sets 
of ART statutes and definitions—one in a state’s parentage code or 
chapter and another in a state’s probate code—they could be set out one 
time in one place. The most natural place for them would be in a state’s 
                                                            
 362  For a survey of the surrogacy laws in each state, see Morrissey, supra note 349, at 485–
514. States that have enacted surrogacy statutes vary with respect to the kinds of contracts that 
are enforceable and the conditions under which they are enforceable. Id. It should also be noted 
that the courts of a particular jurisdiction may have addressed the enforceability of surrogacy 
agreements even if the legislature has not. Id. 
 363  See, e.g., S.F. 2965, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2008); S.F. 2627, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Minn. 2014); H.F. 2593, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2017) (not enacted). 
 364  See, e.g., Act of June 1, 2016, 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 189, art. 13 § 66 (establishing the 
Minnesota Legislative Commission on Surrogacy). 
 365  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 103(c), Legislative Note  (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 366  Colorado and Minnesota are examples. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-115, 15-11-120, 15-
11-121 (2019); MINN. STAT. §524.2-120 (2019). 
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set of parentage laws. The probate code could then refer to the appro-
priate section of the parentage laws for the definitions of “parent-child 
relationship” and other terms relating to parentage. Failing that, an effort 
should be made to ensure that the definitions provided in each set of 
laws are consistent. 
2. Putative Fathers Registry 
Registration with a state’s fathers adoption registry is a means 
by which a putative father may be assured of receiving notice and an 
opportunity to oppose any proposed adoption of a child as to whom his 
possible parentage has not yet been established so that he can protect his 
rights.367 An effort should be made to ensure that the provisions of the 
applicable fathers adoption registry statute are consistent with any 
changes that are made to assisted reproduction statutes. 
3. Adoption laws 
Statutes in some states require adoption records to be retained 
permanently.368 This requirement is important to adoptees. Without it,  
an adoptee’s right to acquire information about his or her birth parents 
upon attaining the age of majority would be of little value.369 Statutes 
governing assisted reproduction should provide for the permanent re-
tention of records pertaining to children of assisted reproduction as well. 
There is no reasonable justification for granting greater rights to adopted 
children than to children of assisted reproduction.370 All provisions of 
the Parentage Act (both current and proposed) should be reviewed to 
ensure consistent treatment of children whether they are adopted or con-
ceived via assisted reproduction with the use of a third-party donor. 
                                                            
 367  A.S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 688 N.E.2d 1215, 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
For an example of a state putative fathers registry statute, see MINN. STAT. § 259.52, subd. 1 
(2019). 
 368  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 259.79, subd. 3 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-113 (2019); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 6-102(d) (2017). 
 369  Many states allow adoptees access to medical and other nonidentifying information about 
their birth parents upon attaining adulthood. Lauren Fair, Shame on Us: The Need for Uniform 
Open Adoption Records Legislation in the United States, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1039, 1041 
(2008). 
 370  John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the 
New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 1015–18 (1986) (comparing the rights of adopted 
children to information about their biological parents with those of children of assisted repro-
duction). 
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4. Indian Child Welfare Act 
The Indian Child Welfare Act371 (ICWA) is a federal enactment 
establishing standards for the custody and placement of children who 
are members of tribes or biological children of tribe members.372 Under 
the Supremacy Clause, no state may enact laws that contradict or con-
flict with it.373 
ICWA defines an “Indian child” as an unmarried person under 
the age of eighteen who is either a member of a tribe or an eligible bio-
logical child of a member of a tribe.374 A “parent” is either a biological 
or adoptive parent of an Indian child.375 An unwed father whose “pater-
nity has not been acknowledged or established” is not a parent.376 In 
short, ICWA requires either a biological or an adoptive relationship.377 
For this reason, it is problematic when state statutes require that a man 
and a child who are not related to each other biologically or through 
adoption be treated as if they are, in fact, biologically related.378 ICWA 
does not authorize states to define people who are not members of a 
tribe and who are neither the biological nor adopted children of a mem-
ber of a tribe as children of a member of a tribe.379 State laws that purport 
to do so conflict with ICWA.380 Expanding nonbiological parentage of 
unadopted children of assisted reproduction to include same-sex 
spouses and unmarried persons who sign ART consent forms will only 
intensify the conflict. 
The simplest way to deal with this conflict would be to enact a 
statute declaring that the state’s parentage laws must be construed con-
sistently with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, United States Code, 
title 25, sections 1901 to 1963. If this is done, then the assisted repro-
duction provisions of a state’s parentage laws would not conflict with 
ICWA. 
                                                            
 371  25 U.S.C. § 1901–1963 (2019). 
 372  25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2019). 
 373  U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2; In re Custody of S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d 872, 880 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1993). 
 374  25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2019). 
 375  25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2019). 
 376  Id. 
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M. DEFINITIONS 
Apart from a statute defining “parent and child relationship,”381 
the UPA 1973 and state statutes adopting it without revision do not have 
a definitions section.382 In view of the technological developments and 
changes in usage that have occurred since 1973, a definitions section 
would be useful. The Task Force agreed.383 
If a state has already set out some definitions in its probate code, 
they should be reviewed to ensure consistency with any definitions that 
are established for purposes of the state’s parentage laws. Better yet, 
definitions relating to parentage could be set out fully in the Parentage 
Act, with the Probate Code cross-referencing them rather than setting 
out a separate set of definitions. 
Definitions should comport with constitutional requirements, re-
flect current usage, and be sufficiently inclusive to accommodate both 
existing and emerging technologies. The UPA 2017 has a definitions 
section.384 It is quite comprehensive and could be used as a model. 
Care also should be taken to ensure that any new definition or 
changes to an existing one do not produce unintended consequences. 
For example, under the UPA 2017, “[a] donor is not a parent of a child 
conceived by assisted reproduction.”385 A “donor” is defined as a person 
“who provides gametes for use in assisted reproduction.”386“ Assisted 
reproduction” means a “method of causing pregnancy other . . . than 
sexual intercourse.”387 Further, women who give birth to children of as-
sisted reproduction are parents, not “donors.”388 These provisions sound 
reasonable enough, but some undesirable consequences that the com-
missioners probably did not intend become evident when these and 
other UPA principles discussed elsewhere in this Article are applied in 
different scenarios. 
                                                            
 381  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1(14), (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
382  Id. 
 383  TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 8. 
 384  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102 & art. 7 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 385  Id. § 702. 
 386  Id. § 102(9). 
 387  Id. § 102(4). 
 388  Id. §§ 102, 201. 
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1.  Sexual intercourse 
If a child is conceived by sexual intercourse, the woman will be 
the mother in any event. Whether the man would be the father will de-
pend on non-ART law.389 Thus, even if a husband and wife consent to 
the wife having sexual intercourse with a different man and everybody 
involved intends the husband to be the father of the child, the husband 
would still only be a presumed father, and then only by virtue of the 
presumption of legitimacy during marriage.390 The second man might 
also be a presumed father if tests evidence a genetic relationship or if he 
and the woman end up living together and holding the child out as their 
own.391 If the man who had sexual intercourse with the woman decides 
to assert parentage of the child, then the husband would need to pursue 
an adoption or an adjudication of parentage to protect his parental 
rights.392 The same principles would apply if a married lesbian couple 
arranges to have one of them become pregnant by means of sexual in-
tercourse with a man.393 Policy makers will need to decide whether this 
is a desirable outcome or not. 
2.  Sperm donation 
A woman who conceives a child using donated sperm would be 
the mother in any event. The man whose sperm is used would not be a 
parent.394 A man whose sperm is not used would not be a parent unless 
he consents to the insemination with the intent to be a parent, he lives 
with and holds the child out as his own, or an applicable presumption is 
not rebutted.395  If any person who provides gametes for assisted repro-
duction is a donor, and donors are not parents of children conceived by 
ART, then a husband whose own sperm is used to inseminate his wife 
by any method other than sexual intercourse would not be a parent of 
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the child.396 It is not likely that the commissioners intended to require 
married men to procreate only by engaging in sexual intercourse. More 
likely, they simply neglected to consider the possibility that a hetero-
sexual couple might choose to use a method other than sexual inter-
course to conceive a child using the husband’s own sperm.397   
3.  Egg donation 
The birth mother would be a parent in any event, whether she 
uses her own or somebody else’s eggs, and whether anybody signs a 
consent form or not.398 A woman who donates eggs for another woman’s 
use would not be a parent.399 Thus, if a female spouse donates gametes 
to her female spouse, one spouse will be a parent and the other will 
not.400 If she had been a male donating gametes to her female spouse, 
they would both be parents.401 This result is at odds with the mandate of  
Obergefell and Pavan to treat same-sex and opposite-sex married cou-
ples alike.402 
As these scenarios illustrate, the definition of “donor” that ap-
pears in the UPA 2017 may need to be tweaked to accommodate situa-
tions in which a woman’s spouse or significant other wants to be a par-
ent but the couple either cannot or chooses not to engage in sexual 
intercourse to accomplish it.403 Defining a donor as a person who pro-
vides gametes for use in assisted reproduction with no intent to be a 
parent would be one way to fix the problem. Another approach would 
be to exclude from the definition a “person who biologically provides 
for, or consents to, assisted reproduction with another person. . .with the 
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intent to be the parent of the child born.”404 Yet another idea would be 
to distinguish between an intended parent who is also the donor and a 
“third-party donor.” This is the approach the Minnesota legislature has 
taken in its Probate Code.405 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In recognizing only artificial insemination as a form of assisted 
reproduction, state statutes are out of date and probably unconstitu-
tional. Limiting the benefits and protections of assisted reproduction 
parentage to opposite-sex married couples discriminates against same-
sex couples, unmarried persons, and single women. Protecting sperm 
donors but not egg donors from the risk of liability for parental respon-
sibilities discriminates against women. State parentage statutes are over-
due for an overhaul. Equipped with an understanding of the specific 
changes needed and the concerns that will need to be addressed when 
making them, there is no longer any reason this cannot be done.   
 
                                                            
 404  Sroka, supra note 228, at 582. Pre-conception intent to be a parent, not the particular 
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